Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1986

Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National
Security Secrecy
Harold Edgar
Columbia Law School, hedgar@law.columbia.edu

Benno C. Schmidt Jr.
Columbia Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security
Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1986).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3024

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

CURTISS-WRIGHT COMES HOME: EXECUTIVE
POWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY

HaroldEdgar*
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.**
Introduction
Collectively we face no greater challenge than maintaining
sensible perspectives on national security issues. Central to this
task is the need to achieve a tolerable balance between secrecy
and openness in public debate on such issues. There are real
threats to our nation, and we would be foolish to ignore them;
history teaches that no culture is guaranteed survival. Yet, how
to respond to such threats must be profoundly controversial.
The virtue of liberal society is that it values highly the realization
of private preferences; the sacrifice of those desires to attain
another's vision of collective security will never be the path
chosen by unanimous vote. There will be constant debate. What
is worth securing? How real is the threat? How best may the
threat be countered? What are the consequences of miscalculation? Each link in the chain is braided with uncertainties, as
we venture ultimate stakes at imponderable odds.
The basic structures-communal, political, often even architectural-of every society have been shaped by a concern
for collective security. Page through The Federalist,our greatest
political tract, and note the priority in argument that Hamilton,
Madison and Jay gave to claims that only union could reduce
the risks of foreign war and influence. The first twenty-nine
essays sound mainly that theme in one key or another. War and
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death come first; only in essay thirty do the authors turn their
attention to the other inevitability-taxes.'
The concern about security is old; what is new is that we
must face it as a democracy of unrivaled complexity, in many
ways more committed to notions of popular sovereignty than
were the Founding Fathers. Freedom of speech and access to
information about security issues are crucial to this democratic
governance; they can also be potent forces in promoting or
obstructing particular policy initiatives. We act through governmental institutions which are rightly revered for their age and
admired for their adaptability, but which are nonetheless unable
to escape the bargain struck at their birth: They were chosen
precisely because they promised both division and controversy,
as well as the opportunity for civic reflection on the uses of
power.
Our complicated politics and venerable institutions face
security issues in the light of scientific and technological accomplishments that have transformed the premises and requirements
of national action, placing the capacity to destroy the world in
the hands of a few individuals. The Archimedean principle that
the earth can be moved with a lever has become the ultimate
threat in a world where techniques for adjustment of discord,
let alone abilities to control the deranged, lag far behind appreciation of the forces that hold mere matter together. Moreover,
the possibilities for spying have been transformed by satellites,
computers, and electronic surveillance techniques of a scope
undreamed of a generation ago.
How can those who would shape our institutions respond
to the threats and complexity of the modern world, and continue
to respect our constitutional traditions of separation of powers
and of informed freedom of expression on issues critical to
democratic governance? That is one of the most important questions for those committed to constitutional government.
Fifteen years ago, the Pentagon Paperslitigation 2 prompted
the two of us to examine the legal posture of publications that
Judicial review, it may be recalled, comes in near the end at number seventyeight.
2New York Times Co. v. Uipited States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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revealed military or national security secrets.3 We undertook
the inquiry with a strong, perhaps blinding, predisposition to
believe that Congress should be the controlling institution in
striking a tolerable balance between secrecy needs and the value
of public debate about foreign and military policy. We believed
congressional primacy to be so obviously right and proper that
we hardly considered the need to defend it, and we assumed
that the Supreme Court in particular would see the virtues of
legislative resolution of secrecy questions. Contrary to our predictions and prescriptions, the years since the PentagonPapers
have seen a considerable enhancement of executive power in
areas of national security secrecy, an aggrandizement significantly assisted by the Supreme Court, with Congress noticeably
absent from the discourse.
We hope in this Commentary to explain our sense of puzzlement and unease about this institutional evolution. In several
important decisions, the Supreme Court's choice of techniques
for dealing with legal materials, as well as the tone of its opinions, seem to signal the Court's belief that Congress need not
participate in the determination of national security secrecy
needs. Even though Congress has been quite active in legislating
about national security problems generally, the current Supreme
Court seems reluctant to abide the slow politics of our separation of powers, and appears to believe that only the Executive
and the Judiciary are capable of defending the nation's ultimate
interests. We believe this message has been heard by lower
courts in national security matters, generating a highly fluid and
aggressive approach to secrecy problems and espionage
prosecutions.
Our concern about this recent trend toward executive empowerment does not rest on the view that there is, in precedent
or in practice, a clear and simple separation of powers model at
work with respect to national security and secrecy. On the
contrary, the dialectical quality of separation of powers theory,
history, polemics and practice that Justice Jackson captured so

3 Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publicationof Defense Information, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 929 (1973).
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memorably in his Steel Seizure concurrence, 4 is particularly
acute in the national security secrecy arena. Justice Black's
stringent statement of legislative hegemony over domestic lawmaking in his opinion for the Court in Steel Seizure,5 and Justice
Sutherland's Curtiss-Wrightobiter dictum concerning the "very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
affairs, ' 6 are the opposing judicial statements confronting those
who would make sense of separation of powers analysis. Each
of these powerful extremes is as simplistic as it is sweeping,
and there is ground for skepticism about any straightforward
characterization of what these decisions stand for. However,
Steel Seizure is generally taken to be the dominant influence on
the domestic front, while Curtiss-Wrightdominates with respect
to foreign policy.7 Categorizing national security secrecy issues
is particularly troubling, since they fall at once into both camps:
Secrecy is essential to the conduct of foreign relations and

4

A judge... may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they actually
present themselves. Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for
Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation
yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected
sources on each side of any question.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
5343 U.S. at 587-88.
6 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
Confusion about the reach of each case is understandable. Truman's seizure of
the steel mills to prevent a work stoppage during the Korean War can easily be regarded
as a domestic regulation essential to foreign policy and military concerns, and thereby
falling under the Executive's authority. In contrast, Curtiss-Wright involved explicit
congressional authorization for the Executive to prohibit the sale of arms to countries
involved in a specific military conflict; it could thus be viewed as consistent with ultimate
congressional control over domestic conduct.
For a recent decision that shows the simultaneous influence of both Curtiss-Wright
and Steel Seizure, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding
executive authority to freeze Iranian assets under International Emergency Economic
Powers Act); Symposium, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 977 (1982). Nor has the Court extended
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942), which upheld executive power to seize assets within the United States in order
to settle the claims of a foreign government, outside the scope of diplomatic recognition
under Article II, § 3, of the Constitution.
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defense strategy; at the same time, however, it stifles domestic
democratic processes and citizens' first amendment rights to
debate controversial issues of national policy.
Other dialectical pressures also plague separation of powers
principles in the context of national security secrecy. The sense
of urgency pressing for an immediate, ad hoc executive response
will often be very strong. Passions will rise. Napoleon's adage
that "the tools belong to the man who can use them" will tend
to govern. A sense of particularity will overwhelm the broader
perspective, and expediency will tend to push aside appeal to
principle.
But it is equally obvious in thinking about government secrecy that information is power-power for effective congressional oversight, power for fueling enlightened public debate
and democratic governance, and power for shaping policy.
Thus, offsetting the sense of urgency and particularity will be
the sense that issues going to the heart of the separation of
powers should be addressed in the language of principle, and
cannot safely be left to the self-interested, ad hoc control of
only one of the players.
Finally, secrecy problems appear to be especially prone to
a judicial dialectic of separation of powers-a dialectic caught
between result and rhetoric. Since Pentagon Papers, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld executive power as a matter of result, even as it adheres to congressional dominance as
a matter of rhetoric. Separation of powers problems almost
never involve an explicit collision between executive action and
statutory mandate; when such collisions arise, no one doubts
that the will of Congress prevails. The interesting issue, then,
is not which branch has the ultimate law-creating authority, but
where to place the burdens of initiative, inertia, and clear statement. Typically, the question is whether the Executive is empowered to do something that is not remotely within the expectation of Congress, so far as one can judge, but which is
nevertheless capable of fitting under some general statutory
umbrella. Perhaps the Executive has asked Congress for the
specific empowerment, and has been refused. Or perhaps the
Executive has taken some action a few times and has not been
challenged in court while Congress stands by and does nothing.
Obviously, in such cases the distribution of the burdens of clear
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statement and legislative inertia will control the outcomes, although the rhetorical theme of congressional dominance can be
sung unabated. In the area of national security secrecy, if the
Executive can take the initiative in the absence of some clear
congressional statement to the contrary, and thus treat legislative inertia as empowering rather than power-limiting, the state
of the existing statutory materials is such that the groundwork
is laid for a Curtiss-Wrightconception of executive power, even
as the pretense of congressional control is honored.
Without embarking upon the futile effort to build a simple
separation of powers model, we believe it safe to say that treatment of secrecy issues in Curtiss-Wright terms, with secrecy
rules emanating solely from the President, is both out of keeping
with our institutional traditions and dangerous to democratic
governance. First, Justice Jackson was surely correct in stating
that "[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending
upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." 8
If executive action is dependent upon what Congress has enacted, what it has refused to enact despite presidential entreaty
and how long it has grappled with the general issues, it is surely
relevant that Congress has repeatedly confronted the national
security problem for over half a century. The more engaged
Congress has been, the more the Court should insist on either
a clear statutory statement or supporting legislative intent as the
predicate for executive power to implement secrecy.
Second, secrecy dilemmas will tend to surface in the context of heated policy disputes. The ad hoc quality of executive
lawmaking will be exacerbated when the assessment of secrecy
needs is tied to current political sympathies and antipathies.
Moreover, the Executive is inherently self-interested in expanding the scope of matters deemed "secret"; the more that is
secret, the more that falls under executive control. There is
surely room in our separation of powers dialectic, confused as
it is, to doubt the wisdom of allowing the fox to define the
parameters of-not to mention guard-the chicken coop.
Finally, the fact that first amendment concerns permeate
the area of national security secrecy should cause the Supreme

8343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Court to insist on a clear statutory statement as the predicate
for any exercise of executive power that trenches on constitutionally protected liberties. In other contexts, the Court has
refused to consider open-ended statutory language to authorize
a constitutionally suspect action without either a clear legislative
statement or a surrounding context that in fact indicated
congressional acquiescence. 9 This prescript has proven especially useful in dealing with sensitive constitutional areas, where
it was very difficult to create principled limits on government
power, and where the power could be easily and grossly abused.
Sometimes the Court's position was that Congress had not in
fact authorized a given action; sometimes it ruled that even if
Congress had intended by vague language to authorize something constitutionally suspect, Congress should be required to
assume political responsibility by making that authorization explicit. Alexander Bickel best articulated the thrust of these
decisions:
When should the Court recall the legislature to its own
policy-making function? Obviously, the answer must
lie in the importance of the decision left to the administrator or other official. And this is a judgment that
will naturally be affected by the proximity of the area
of delegated discretion to a constitutional issue. The
more fundamental the issue, the nearer it is to principle, the more important it is that it be decided in the
first instance by the legislature. 10
Even if one takes the view, as we do, that courts should be
deferential when confronted with a clear congressional determination to.protect some category of secrets by restrictions on
publication, the presence of vital first amendment interests is
nevertheless undeniable. These interests ought to lead courts to
insist that secrecy norms reflect the political consent and public
participation embodied in legislation, rather than the self-interested bureaucratic discretion that is likely to be the character

9 See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25-27 (1968).
10A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 161 (1962).
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of executive action. This, in turn, suggests that courts should
encourage the resolution of problems by statutes in which consideration of principle can be articulated in the language of
general lawmaking, rather than by executive action in which
overbroad standards applied with extreme selectivity are the
normal mode of address.
Several of the secrecy issues recently before the Supreme
Court help to explain the Court's penchant for taking CurtissWright as its cue, rather than Steel Seizure. First, two of the
most important cases to reach the Court have involved the
imposition of legal sanctions on former Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) agents." No one doubts that the Executive can
invoke a wide range of administrative sanctions to enforce secrecy rules on its employees; the more difficult questions concern resort to broader sanctions that must be enforced by the
courts. The current Supreme Court appears to regard the Executive's power in the secrecy area as virtually plenary with
respect to executive employees, even if they have left the service. At least in cases where criminal sanctions are not involved,
the Court has been willing to lend its own enforcement powers.
In addition, this Court has made plain its devotion to the CIA,2
and its readiness to employ broad secrecy rules on its behalf.'
More generally, it appears to us that several members of the
current Court are drawn to the British constitutional tradition
of official secrets-airtight legal obligations of confidence imposed on all government employees. 3 In this tradition, freedom
of speech about information gleaned in the course of government
service is regarded as dangerous, disloyal and naive.
We must also recognize the possibility that the Supreme
Court perceives Congress as crippled when it comes to punishing revelations of national security information. The past fifteen
years have produced a great deal of legislation to improve the
laws bearing upon many aspects of intelligence gathering and

1Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); Haig v. Agee, 450 U.S.
280 (1981).
12See, e.g., Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511 n.6 (expounding on trust obligation as implicit
condition of CIA employment).
1 The notion that only Whitehall need know what the British government is doing
in the name of national security was codified by Britain in its Official Secrets Act, 1911,
I & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28, § 2.
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national security. 14 However, even though it is common knowledge that the current statutes are hopelessly muddled, Congress
has found it impossible to enact more coherent general legislation protecting national defense information against revelation.
The effort to clarify would have required firm answers to too
many difficult questions.15 Indeed, since Pentagon Papers, the
legal community has seen Congress several times poised over
major efforts at the comprehensive reform of the entire federal
criminal code-surely the least coherent body of substantive
criminal law that any major western nation endures-only to
have these huge undertakings founder, in part because Congress
could not reach a consensus on national security issues. Even
the relatively minor controls imposed by the Intelligence Identities Protection Act 16 occasioned a major confrontation between
press and government over the possible ambiguities in the
17
statute.
One must ask whether the Supreme Court believes, on the
basis of recent experiences, that Congress is unable to fashion
acceptable rules in areas where national security confronts first
amendment issues. Because Congress must deal with secrecy
issues in the language of general lawmaking, under constant
challenge by the press, it must set forth statutory principles of
restraint, each aspect of which needs to be measured against
not only the speech component of the first amendment but its
egalitarian aspects as well. In effect, Alexander Bickel's provocative thesis-that the legislature is the forum in which expedience dominates principle, and that courts are by process
and title the custodians of decision according to principle 8 -is
institutionally transposed in the national security field. In this
context, it is Congress that must act with principle across a
general range of intense and variegated controversy or be denounced by the press for ignoring its constitutional responsibil14 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982); Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1985); Central Intelligence
Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. 1985).

1- See generally Schwartz, Reform of the FederalCriminal Laws: Issues, Tactics,
and Prospects, 1977 Duke L.J. 171.
16 50 U.S.C. § 421 (Supp. 1985).
17See N.Y. Times, March 4, 1982, at A22, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 22, 1982, at

A14, col. 1.

18A. Bickel, supra note 10, at 24-28.
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ity. Yet, on the general level at which Congress must shape
policy, no completely principled solution to the problem of regulating national security is adequate. 19 Congress, therefore, remains passive on this aspect of national security, and the Court
feels the pressure to permit the Executive to fill the gap. On the
other hand, by carefully choosing attractive targets without any
declaration of principle and under vaguely enunciated legal
norms, the20 Executive can favor security interests over speech
concerns.
Since both the context and target of restraint are compelling, the courts feel pressed to uphold these ad hoc initiatives
,because the idea of no effective secrecy constraints seems unthinkable. And if the courts endorse these executive actions,
the public and even the legal profession will tend to let the
appeal of the particular result quiet any doubts about the scope
of executive power that is upheld.
If the premise of the Court's recent decisionmaking is that
the Executive is more capable than Congress of responding to
issues of national security secrecy, the Court has yet to justify
it. The theme we wish to sound most strongly in this Commentary is that the Judiciary is not attending adequately to its re-

19Congress' difficulty in acting is not attributable simply to the power of the press.
See, for example, the effort of mathematicians to balance free publication of cryptography research with security concerns. This group concluded that any attempt at
congressional legislation would be too risky, and chose instead to establish a voluntary
prior restraint mechanism. See Schwartz, Scientific Freedom and National Security:A
Case Study of Cryptography, in Striking a Balance: National Security and Scientific
Freedom (H. Relyea ed. 1985).
20Thus, the President's power to license trade with Cuba, under Regan v. Wald,
104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984), permits him to forbid spending money on travel, but then to
grant individual licenses to choose who travels as jouralists or professional researchers.
The Executive determines whether people fall within these categories in response to
individuals' requests for permission. For example, is a student writing for a school
newspaper a journalist? The Executive thought not. By contrast, the problem of defining
terms like "journalist" is one of the reasons Congress has never enacted a press shield
law. Thus, reliance on executive discretion permits the law to maintain its symbolic
generality and avoid the loss that defining the press in terms of dollars earned or hours
spent at it would occasion. The price among others is tolerating all the injustices that
insistence on rules is designed to avoid. The problem is the familiar one of rule and
discretion.
Is it constitutionally perverse-or simply the logical outcome of individuating the
process of choice where conflicts between values is sharpest-that in contexts where
speech and national security interests genuinely conflict, the courts accept overbreadth
and vagueness without serious question, even though this is the area of central first
amendment concern?
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sponsibility to explain. There are many occasions in our recent
constitutional history where the Supreme Court has altered either the content of legal principle or institutional relationships
in response to a perception of political stalemate or institutional
paralysis. However, the notion that executive/judicial activism
should overcome an unresponsive Congress in the area of national security secrecy is surely flawed. Perhaps an aggressive
judicial response is warranted in some cases of political stalemate: those where judicial intervention can vindicate what the
Court sees as simple constitutional principles, or contribute to
fair and responsive democratic processes. 21 Yet no such conception of principle or process supports the Court's institutional
competence to decide national security secrecy issues for itself,
or to lend its powers to enforcement of.executive initiatives.
Nevertheless, to vindicate its own approval of executive visions
of security, the Burger Court is rejecting not only its predecessor's tradition of searching for clear legislative authority before
limiting individual rights, 22 but also one of the most profound

commitments of our free speech tradition-the notion that, unlike the British, we would not empower the Executive to control
23
speech about the government.
Indeed, in the Pentagon Papers case, we now believe,
although the point escaped us before, the Supreme Court was
caught in a state of tension between the precepts of Steel Seizure
and Curtiss-Wright.The Justices in PentagonPapersrecognized
that, under conventional separation of powers analysis, no legal
norm existed to support the Executive's plea for an injunction.
At the same time, they registered disturbance about the fact
that, outside the context of restricted data under the Atomic
Energy Act, 24 Congress had made no provision for injunctions
21 The great decisions on race and reapportionment can be seen in this light. See
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); see also J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 121 (1980).
2 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); see also A. Bickel, supra note
10, at 156-66.
2 The entire history of Congress' handling of national security secrecy proposals

by the President indicates an abiding distrust of executive control. See Edgar & Schmidt,

supra note 3, 952-60, 1051-52. The contrast with the British approach in their Official
Secrets Act is stark. i2f. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1982).
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to preserve critical national secrets. For this reason, only Justice
Marshall embraced Steel Seizure without hedge, and regarded
Congress, dormant or active, as entirely controlling the field of
national security secrecy respecting the regulation of the press.
All of the others were prepared to subordinate Congress to their
own views of either the first amendment or executive hegemony,
or both.
I. Pentagon PapersRevisited
When the Nixon Administration sought to enjoin publication of the "Pentagon Papers" 5 fifteen years ago, we were struck
by what seemed the bizarre institutional premises of the Administration's main legal position. The government argued that
without any statutory authorization, the President, in his role
as commander-in-chief and steward of foreign relations, could
create a legal norm of secrecy and enlist the injunctive powers
of the federal courts to enforce this norm against publications
that posed a "grave and irreparable danger" to national security.
The government's brief in the Supreme Court did not even
26
mention the statutory situation.
Even if the Executive could sue for injunctive relief without
statutory authorization, 27 he cannot create the legal rule that he
seeks to enforce in the domestic arena. Since Congress had
made no law, what possible basis could there have been even
to consider the first amendment?
The absence of legislative authorization was noted in the
questions at oral argument and in several of the Justices' opin28
ions, although only Marshall argued that it should be decisive.
Of the six Justices who concurred in the judgment against the
government, all but Justice Brennan relied to some degree on
the absence of statutory authority for injunctive relief. MoreSee New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
In addition to the inherent executive power argument, the government had sought
to rely on the espionage statutes in the district court proceeding against The New York
Times. See United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 328-30 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). Judge Gurfein held the statutes inapplicable to "publication," and the government
abandoned the statutes on appeal.
27 See, e.g., P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H.Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's
The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1301-09 (2d ed. 1973).
2 403 U.S. at 740 (Marshall, J., concurring).
2
2
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over, considerable interest was expressed on the different issue
of criminal sanctions for publication of classified government
documents. A number of the Justices volunteered readings of
the espionage statutes in relation to hypothetical criminal proceedings against the publishers, reporters and information
sources involved, 29 even though such questions had not been
briefed, were dreadfully difficult, and were quite unnecessary
to a ruling about the injunction.
These speculative dicta addressing the potential capacity of
the espionage statutes to criminalize publication of the "Pentagon Papers," when added to our own institutional predispositions, led us fifteen years ago to exaggerate the extent to which
the Court accepted the premise of legislative hegemony over
national security secrecy issues. 0 With hindsight, we now believe that the central theme of the Pentagon Papers opinions,
at least in institutional terms, was the suprising willingness of
many of the Justices to contemplate scenarios set in a statutory
vacuum,* where executive power backed by judicial support
would govern issues of national security secrecy, at least so long
as Congress remained a passive bystander.
In contrast to the opinions of the individual Justices, the
terse per curiam opinion of the Court fails to mention the legislative situation at all. It rests solely on the basis that the
government failed to overcome the constitutional presumption
31
against prior restraints.
2 Justice White's concurrence was the principal warning to reporters that the
statutes might be applied to them. His opinion detailed a construction of § 793 of Title

18 that would impose criminal liability on newspapers for retaining defense secrets, a

necessary step in publishing them. 403 U.S. at 735-40 (White, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart joined Justice White's opinion, and wrote for himself that the criminal statutes
are "of very colorable relevance to the apparent circumstances of these cases." Id. at
730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, id. at 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting),
and Justice Blackmun, id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); respectively registered

"general agreement" and "substantial accord" about these matters, though they were
not raised in a litigation which they complained had otherwise proceeded too hurriedly
for careful judgment on the relatively narrow questions briefed and argued. Justice

Marshall, though not approving the construction, noted its plausibility. Id. at 743-46
(Marshall, J., concurring).
30Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 931.
31 For

support, the per curiam cites a strange grabbag of three cases, 403 U.S. at

714: the first, Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), rejected a legislatively

authorized system of administrative threats of obscenity prosecution; the second, Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), rejected a legislatively authorized system of prior

restraints on libelous and scandalous publications; and the third, Organization for a
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Justice Black's opinion, joined by Justice Douglas, was a
fiery statement of first amendment absolutism. He would deny
any governmental power, no matter what the statutory foundation, to censor or punish the press for reporting on military or
foreign policy. Although Black referred to the lack of legislative
authorization for the government's action,32 it was plainly an
afterthought. Douglas, in his own opinion, gave the legislative
posture considerable attention; in the end, however, he seemed
to conclude that, at least when no declared war is being waged,
the first amendment protects absolutely any speech relating to
military policy. Brennan does not even mention the statutory
situation or the position of Congress; he rests his opinion entirely on the first amendment.
On the dissenting side, Chief Justice Burger showed little
interest in the statutory situation as a guide to the scope of
executive and judicial power to enjoin publication. Justice Harlan did note the statutory situation in the course of canvassing
various questions which he thought impossible to examine adequately in the "frenzied train of events" resulting from the
accelerated judicial proceedings. 3 But when he reluctantly dame
to the merits, Harlan discounted Congress' role in fashioning
secrecy rules. Although he stressed principles of separation of
powers as the key to judicial action, as had Marshall, Harlan
Was pursuing a radically different institutional end. From the
premise, drawn from Curtiss-Wright, that "[tihe President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations," Harlan reasoned that the Executive must be empowered to impose secrecy
on any matter concerning foreign relations or national security,
and must also presumably be able to enlist the courts in enforcing secrecy decisions.3 4 For Harlan, the Judiciary's role should
be very narrow and passive, merely determining whether a matter was within the general compass of foreign relations and
national security.35 If so, the courts should support the ExecuBetter Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), rejected an injunction against leafletting
which had no statutory basis. None of the cited case's focused on the presence or
absence of legislative authority for the legal controls under review; none dealt with the
activities of the federal government; and none had anything to do with national security.
3 403 U.S. at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring).
33 Id. at 753 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
34 Id. at 756, citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-21.
35403 U.S. 713, 759-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tive. Congress' function was not even mentioned. Like Harlan,
Blackmun in his dissent gave no consideration to the role of
36
Congress.
Stewart and White, the two Justices who found themselves
between the blocks of three, and whose centrist views of the
first amendment thus controlled the outcome, began from strikingly different institutional premises. Most of Stewart's opinion
is an eloquent statement of executive supremacy and, like Harlan's opinion, rested on Curtiss-Wright.37 According to Stewart,
the Constitution endows the President with "enormous power
in the two related areas of national defense and international
relations ... largely unchecked by the Legislative and Judicial
branches ... .-"38 Stewart recognized that informed public opinion is the only effective check on the President's exercise of
power, and yet that the successful conduct of foreign and defense policy depends on secrecy. Stewart saw only one answer
to this dilemma:
The responsibility must be where the power is. If the
Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the
maintenance of our national defense, then under the
Constitution the Executive must have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of
internal security necessary to exercise that power
successfully. 39
Congress and the courts entered Stewart's institutional matrix through the back door. Congress could protect secrecy by
enacting criminal statutes that the courts would have to enforce.
But the case at hand did not enlist the Court to apply specific
laws; the Justices were being "asked ...

to perform a function

36 Harlan added the procedural safeguard that the secrecy determination be made
personally by the head of the relevant executive department. 403 U.S. at 757 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
37Professor Cox has pointed out that Stewart's puzzling opinion can be read as a

startling assertion that the Executive had the "sovereign prerogative" to prevent The

New York Times from publishing by use of naked force. Cox, Foreword: Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7 n.15 (1980).
3' 403 U.S. at 727 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
39Id. at 728-29.
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'40
that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not the Judiciary.
Stewart seemed to be saying that the Constitution gave the
Executive the function of creating a secrecy norm that would
bar The New York Times from publishing. Then, surprisingly
and without any apparent connection to what had come before,
Stewart invoked the first amendment and concluded that the
injunction must be denied because he cannot say that publication would "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
'4
damage to our Nation or its people." '
In contrast to Stewart, White seemed to think that Congress
bears most of the constitutional responsibility for regulation of
press publication of national security secrets. 42 White's opinion
stressed the lack of any legislative basis for an injunction and
outlined the inadequacies of the judicial process as a means of
fashioning sound principles of secrecy. 43 Nevertheless, White
did share Stewart's view that because there was no apparent
proof of irreparable injury, no injunction could issue. Presumably, it follows that irreparable injury would somehow overcome
the absence of congressional action.
Thus, even if Douglas is counted with White and Marshall
as seeing Congress as the controlling institution, only three of
nine Justices saw the institutional framework in these terms.
Only Marshall unqualifiedly anchored his opinion in the basic
separation of powers principle that Congress alone can impose
national security secrecy obligations on persons outside
government. 44
Those of us who saw the Pentagon Papers decision as
primarily embodying the Steel Seizure theme of congressional
authority over national security secrecy were wrong. In fact,
the advocates of first amendment absolutism, and the proponents of executive authority Ala Curtiss-Wright, were equally
forceful within the Court. Now, however, the absolutists are
gone, and those supporting Curtiss-Wright-ratherthan those
supporting Steel Seizure-have come to 4ominate the develop-

4
Id. at 729.
41
Id. at 730.
41In fact, White saw "no difficulty" in applying the espionage statutes after publication occurred. Id. at 737 (White, J., concurring).
43Id. at 732-33.
" Id. at 742-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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ment of constitutional doctrine in this area.45 Thus, CurtissWright has come home.
II. The Supreme Court and the Problem of Process
It is said that when Louis D. Brandeis was a practicing
lawyer and he wanted his clients to understand that he really
meant "no," he gave them no reasons.
In recent opinions touching upon national security mat46
ters, the Supreme Court has upheld executive actions that limit
the rights of Americans to speak freely about the government
and to travel the world. The Court in each case determined that
Congress authorized the presidential action in question, but in
none did the Court treat fairly the legislative materials on which
it grounded presidential authority. Nor did it weigh carefully the
exigency of the executive action against the individual liberties
at stake.
Like Brandeis' way of saying "no," the opinions in these
cases seem designed, by their summary dismissal of important
problems, to send a message to Congress, the legal profession,
and the press: 47 Neither conventional first and fifth amendment
analysis about the scope of individual rights, nor conventional
separation of powers notions, impose much restraint on exec41Indeed, the Pentagon Papers decision and the decision the following term in
United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407
U.S. 297 (1972), mark the last time that the Steel Seizure vision of separation of powers
overcame executive claims of authority to act. Since then, with the arguable exception
of the Watergate affair, see Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425
(1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), claims of executive empowerment
have been repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court; no presidential action has been
rejected by the Court on grounds that Congress had not authorized it. See Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), in which the Court managed to find congressional
authorization for the terms of the Iranian hostage settlement. See also AFL-CIO v.
Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding executive authority to set wage and price
standards for government contractors). But see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
304-06 (1979) (questioning the statutory basis for affirmative action programs). See
generally Brody, Congress, the President, and FederalEqual Employment Policymaking, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 239 (1980).
4 Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Snepp
v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); see also United States v. Marchetti,
466 F.2d 1309, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
47These decisions can be seen as similar to the Court's irritated view of first
amendment jurisprudence in press cases, where, whether holding for or against the
press, the opinions often give vent to anger at the media's estimation of its role in
supervising us all.
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utive power in the national security secrecy area. This message
gives life to the Curtiss-Wright strain in Pentagon Papers.
To date, the Court has yet to provide an explicit statement
of its changing perception of the relationships between executive
initiative and residual congressional authority in relation to national security secrecy. All it has offered in the way of analysis
of constitutional rights is a series of naked ipse dixits. One
problem with this injudicious approach is that it is contagious;
one can hardly be surprised when lower federal courts adopt
this stance on matters of institutional process. At first, the readjustment of the Curtiss-Wright/Steel Seizure tension occurred
sotto voce at the Supreme Court level; now lower courts are
beginning to treat novel executive claims about the reach of
criminal statutes with a comparably freewheeling approach.
A. CIA Secrecy Contracts
In a letter proffered by the CIA's counsel to the district
court in the first of the secrecy agreement cases, CIA Director
Colby stated:
The continued effectiveness of the United States foreign intelligence collection effort is dependent upon the
adequate protection of the intelligence sources and
methods involved. In recognition of this, Congress,
under Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of
1947, made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure. Unfortunately,
there is no statutory authority to implement this responsibility ....
In most cases, existing law is ineffective in preventing disclosures of information relating to intelligence sources and methods. Except in cases involving
communications intelligence, no criminal action lies
against persons disclosing classified information without authorization ...

there is no existing statutory au48

thority for injunctive relief.

"8Letter from William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to Roy L. Ash,
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One might have thought that this admission would have
jeopardized the CIA's chances of securifig injunctive relief
against a former CIA employee's threatened publication of information about the Agency; at least it might have limited injunctive possibilities to revelations that posed "direct, immediate and irreparable injury to the Nation"-the predicate for
injunctions unaided by statute. The case against such relief
would be further strengthened by the fact that Congress was
asked to provide authority for such a program, and refused to
49
do so.
Nonetheless, the Executive was able to implement and secure Supreme Court validation in Snepp v. United States,50 of
a comprehensive program of prior restraints directed at present
_--d former government employees who had signed secrecy
agretments promising not to divulge or publish information
about the CIA without the express written consent- of the
Director.
We do not view this system of prior restraints as necessarily
unsound as a matter of policy, although we have doubts.5 1 Nor
do we believe that the courts should invalidate such a program
on first amendment grounds if Congress authorized it in reasonably clear terms. Private employment contracts frequently im-'
pose secrecy obligations which courts routinely enforce. While
government employees have first amendment rights, those rights
may be limited by criteria not applicable to citizens in general.

Director, Office of Management and Budget, Jan. 14, 1974 (Knopf v. Colby, 509 F.2d
1362 (4th Cir. 1975), unpublished appendix, vol. 1) (emphasis added) [on file with the

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review].

49 See Security ClassificationReform: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 363 (1974).

o 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
W hasten to add, because we have been misread on this point, that we do not
We
regard this program as misguided or impermissible on the grounds that employees cannot
work for the CIA without contracting away their right to speak about it. Easterbrook,
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 347, is wrong in his reading of Edgar & Schmidt, supra
note 3, at 1078-79. An adhesion contract is not automatically unenforceable. Our
concern, then and now, is the issue of congressional authorization. Curiously, Easterbrook, in discussing insider trading, worries about whether the SEC's approach had
been legislatively authorized, and faults the Court for not inquiring. Easterbrook, supra,
at 318-20. As to the CIA's authority to create this legal regime, however, Easterbrook
is content to say that the Court found congressional authorization. The Court did indeed

so find. The question is whether Congress actually provided it.
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Inasmuch as the government interest in securing many intelligence secrets is clearly compelling, the government, as employer, may52 make employment contracts calling for preservation
of secrets.
On the other hand, one can be sure that.a prepublication
clearance system within the CIA will be a disaster for core first
amendment values. The problems endemic to wholesale administrative censorship will flourish ift this context: any doubts will
be resolved in favor of suppression; gross overbreadth and
vagueness will characterize the standards for censorship; bureaucratic self-interest will result in selective enforcement; delay
will be inevitable; and decisions will be made behind a veil of
secrecy. 3 The process will be expensive, debilitating and
5
chilling.
54
1. United States v. Marchetti

The legal saga of CIA secrecy agreements begins with a
case that should have reached the Supreme Court, but did not.
In April 1972, the government moved ex parte against former
CIA officer Victor Marchetti to enjoin him from revealing defense information in breach of a secrecy agreement he made
when he joined the CIA. 55 The specific issue was whether the
United States had a right to insist upon prepublication clearance,
on the theory that an enforceable contract had been made.
Marchetti wished to publish a book. The Fourth Circuit held
the contract lawful insofar as it barred revelation to anyone of
classified information not in the pubfic domain; it approved an
injunction requiring Marchetti to submit his proposed writings
to the CIA for clearance.
51In fact, in 1983, the Executive attempted with its National Security Decision
Directive No. 84 (NSDD 84) (March 11, 1983) to institute across-the-board secrecy
contracts for all government employees. NSDD 84 was rejected by Congress. Dep't. of
State Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1984-85. 97 Stat. 1017, 1061.
3 See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 648 (1955). On the workings of the CIA program, see S. Turner, Secrecy and
Democracy: The CIA in Transition x-xii (1985); R. McGehee, Deadly Deceipts: My
Twenty-Five Years in the CIA 196-203 (1983).
m 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972)..
51The courts called these agreements "contracts," although as written they impress
upon the signer the possible criminality of intelligence revelations and waive property
rights, rather than, as is customary with private sector secrecy agreements, making
employment itself the consideration for the promise not to reveal secrets.
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On the matter of legislative authority, the Marchetti court
merely noted that the National Security Act of 1947 imposed on
the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. '56 Without adverting to the many decisions of the previous two decades limiting executive actions that would affect
individual rights by the requirement of explicit statutory authorization, 57 Judge Haynsworth concluded that secrecy agreements are "entirely appropriate to a program in implementation
of the congressional direction of secrecy."58 Indeed, because
confidentiality "inheres in the situation,"5 9 and because "infor-

mation highly sensitive to the conduct of foreign affairs and the
national defense was involved, the law would probably imply a
secrecy agreement had there been no formally expressed agreement .... "60
Judge Haynsworth did not wholly abandon the field to the
Executive. He insisted that in accepting employment with the
CIA and by signing the secrecy agreement, Marchetti retained
his first amendment right to criticize the agency so long as he
61
did not release classified information.
The institutional premises of Haynsworth's opinion were
startling. He claimed first that the Supreme Court had been
more "flexible" (read: deferential) in applying the first amendment to actions taken by the judicial and executive branches
than to actions taken by Congress:
This flexible approach toward the executive and judicial branch is warranted not only because they are
omitted from the express language of the First Amendment, but also because they lack legislative capacity
50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1982).
17
18

59

See discussion supra, text accompanying note 22.
466 F.2d at 1316.

Id.
6OId.
61The Fourth Circuit required the CIA to act within thirty days in reviewing any

material submitted by Marchetti, and noted that Marchetti would be entitled to judicial
review of any censoring decision. The only questions for review, the court thought,
would be whether the information was in fact classified, and whether it had been

officially disclosed. There would be no review of the propriety of the classification itself,
since "the process of classification is part of the executive function beyond the scope
of judicial review." 466 F.2d at 1317.
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to establish a pervasive system of censorship. This case
itself illustrates the point that the executive and judicial
branches proceed on a case-by-case basis, the executive branch being dependent on the judiciary to restrict
unwarranted disclosures .62
This is really a breathtaking concept in the national security
secrecy context. The contract rule of Marchetti is of course a
general rule of submission to censorship by all CIA employees.
Perhaps all Haynsworth meant here was that the first amendment must be "flexible" in governing the executive branch's
relations with its own employees. That alone would be fine, but
his supporting examples are not limited to employees, and his
comments seem to go to executive action generally, displaying
no concern for extension of executive authority, regardless of
congressional action, into the field of domestic activity.
The other related institutional premise of Haynsworth's
opinion derives explicitly from Curtiss-Wright,which is cited to
support the need for secrecy and the broad powers of the President in national security matters. Having established that Marchetti can be enjoined from disclosing classified information
obtained in the course of employment, the court continued:
The CIA is one of the executive agencies whose activities is closely related to the conduct of foreign affairs
and to the national defense. Its operations, generally,
are an executive function beyond the control of the
judicial power. If in the conduct of its operations the
need for secrecy requires a system of classification of
documents and information, the process of classification is part of the executive function beyond the scope
6
of judicial review.
Despite the rich array of novel first amendment issues involved
in this case, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 64
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1317,
- 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). The Fourth Circuit's conclusion about the unreviewability
61
63

of classification decisions came undone in further proceedings before the district court.
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2. Snepp v. United States65
When he began work for the CIA, Frank Snepp signed an
agreement essentially similar to Marchetti's. 66 After his resignation from the agency, Snepp published a book highly critical
of CIA activities in Vietnam. Plainly, the book was full of information that Snepp had obtained during the course of his
employment, but Snepp insisted he was careful not to reveal
any classified information. His aim in publishing, Snepp
claimed, was patriotic. He wanted to expose weakness and
incompetence in the Agency and thus contribute to public
debate.
Unlike Marchetti, Snepp actually published his book before
seeking CIA clearance. The Agency then sued him for failing to
submit the manuscript for prepublication review. 67 For purposes
Marchetti subsequently sought to publish a book that he co-authored, and submitted
it to the CIA in accordance with the injunction previously approved. The CIA initially
ordered deletion of 339 items; the number of deletions sought was eventually reduced
to 168. Marchetti and his publisher challenged all of these deletions before the district
judge who had tried the first Marchetti case. What happened at trial was revealing.
Perhaps because he had been ordered not to consider the reasonableness of classification, the trial judge insisted on strict proof that each item had in fact been classified by
conscious decision of a properly authorized official. The CIA could not satisfy this test
for the vast majority of deletions. It was not enough, the trial judge thought, that an
item appeared in a classified document, since that document might contain large amounts
of unclassified information. Only when a classified document indicated specifically that
a particular item should be classified did the trial judge approve the deletion. Twentysix of the 168 deletions survived this test.
By the time this second ruling was appealed to the Fourth Circuit, the October
1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982) (FOIA),
had taken effect. The amended FOIA made clear that only properly classified information was exempt from disclosure, and provided for de novo judicial review of classification orders. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in MarchettiII concluded that only if
information was both classified and properly classifiable could it be subject to deletion
under the CIA's secrecy agreement with Marchetti. Knopf v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362
(1975). However, the Fourth Circuit noted that "any significant intelligence operations"
were classifiable, and that under "the prescription of regularity in the performance by
a public official of his public duty," courts should presume that information properly
classifiable was in fact classified. This relieved the CIA of any need to prove actual
classification.
444 U.S. 507 (1980).
6 Snepp's agreeme6t provided that he would "not... publish.., any information
or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific j rior approval of the
Agency." 444 U.S. at 508.
67 The CIA made no move to enjoin him prior to publication, alleging that Snepp
had led it to believe that he would submit the book pursuant to the agreement. In fact,
Snepp surreptitiously arranged to have the book published without CIA knowledge. Id.
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of the litigation, and in order to establish the full scope of its
power, the CIA conceded that Snepp had not revealed classified
information. It sought damages for breach of contract, an injunction against further publications without clearance, and the
imposition of a constructive trust over Snepp's advances and
profits from the book.
8
The district court granted the CIA's relief as requested.6
The Fourth Circuit affirmed all but the remedy of a constructive
trust. 69 That court, while agreeing that Snepp had violated the
contract by not submitting his book for clearance, noted that
under Marchetti, Snepp had a right after submission to publish
anything not classified. Thus, the court of appeals thought the
CIA's only remedy should be compensatory and punitive damages for any classified information that Snepp actually
published.
This difference in relief was significant, and furnished the
basis for the Supreme Court's reversal that reinstated the district
court's remedy. Under the constructive trust remedy, which
avoided putting the question of damages to a jury that might
well have been sympathetic to Snepp, he would be liable for all
his advances and royalties, amounting to well over $100,000.70
By contrast, under the court of appeals' approach, the CIA
would have to prove to a jury that Snepp had revealed classified
information, and then ask it to assess the damages for such
revelations.
Snepp petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. One
might have thought that the case posed a number of critical
questions that the Supreme Court would want to approach with
caution. Only the Fourth Circuit had dealt with the constitutional and statutory ramifications of CIA secrecy contracts, and
its analysis in Marchetti seemed open to reconsideration on a
number of points. The Fourth Circuit had regarded the Director's statutory mandate to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure as establishing the requisite

61s
United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978).
69United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979).
70Id. at 929. This remedy proved ruinous for Snepp, who was liable for all of his
advances and royalties, including those he had lived on while writing the book. He was
ultimately bankrupted.
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legislative authorization for his actions. This conclusion, however, was easy to quarrel with if any degree of statutory explicitness or realistic assessment of legislative intent were
thought necessary.7 1 Second, with no analysis whatsoever, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that Marchetti had no right to publish
classified. information, and that the risk to the government from
disclosure was so great as to warrant a prior restraint system.
Yet, if one point stands out in the half-century of pulling and
hauling between Congress and the Executive over secrecy issues, it is that Congress has consistently refused to enforce the
classification system with criminal sanctions, even when government employees breach it.72 The Marchetti decisions thus
manifest judicial approval of both the censorship of more information than Congress has been willing to regulate and the ap73
plication of more speech-restrictive methods in order to do so.
Beyond Marchetti, there remained the question of how to
treat a former CIA employee who asserts that he took care not
to publish anything classified. Snepp's speech dealt with matter
at the heart of the first amendment-information and criticism
about the government in relation to the most heated public
debate of the 1960's and 1970's. The PentagonPapers opinions
converge on the proposition that this kind of information cannot
be restrained, at least when in the hands of the press, unless
revelation "will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." 74 What should be the
first amendment standard for imposing liability on Snepp? If,
absent the contract, he would have substantial first amendment
protection in publishing this material, how should the Court
resolve the knotty problem of contracting away core first amendment rights in this highly charged arena?

71Research by Thomas Troy reveals that the "sources and methods" phrase origi-

nated with the military services who were concerned with the prospect of revealing
communications intelligence to the CIA, and wanted to impose on the CIA the duty not
to reveal it. See Troy, 4 Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene No. 6, 5-8 (Dec. 1985).
72See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 1052.
7 Congress has refused to make criminal the revelation of "intelligence data" in a
manner analogous to the restricted data provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. Instead,
it limited criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 798 to the revelation of classified information on communications intelligence activities, an information category far narrower
than that embraced by the CIA's prior-restraint-by-contract regime.
74403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court's response to these questions was cavalier-not only substantively, but as a matter of process as well.
Although Snepp was a case of first impression, the Court did
not even go through its normal process of briefing, oral argument
and deliberation before it decided against Snepp in every conceivable way. Professor Cox has suggested that judicial indignation at Snepp's "shabby violation of a personal confidence
voluntarily accepted" prompted the Court's summary treatment
of the case. 75 Plainly, however, indignation ought to cause the
judicial pulse to slow, rather than quicken, in terms of the care
taken in the decision-making process. But even if indignation
intruded where it had no business, the more important question
concerns whether one should take seriously the hard-fought
lesson of our constitutional tradition-that wholesale administrative censorship of the CIA variety presents the greatest threat
to freedom of expression. If one sees in Snepp's book not
destructive revelation, but the measured criticism of a disillusioned CIA officer who believed with plausible justification that
the Agency callously failed "to protect intelligence sources" in
Vietnam; if one accepts Snepp's assertion that he took care to
publish nothing that would compromise ongoing intelligence
gathering operations, an assertion uncontroverted by the CIA;
and above all, if one believes that Congress should govern secrecy issues respecting the CIA, at least as concerns draconian
penalties imposed through the judicial process, then indignation
against Snepp should be quickly supplanted by a sense of the
need for disinterested judgment on the serious questions that
call for resolution. To scorn Snepp's actions is to scorn longstanding elements of our constitutional tradition regarding
speech about public affairs.
If ever an opinion stands as a lesson against dispensing with
the usual deliberative procedures, it is the per curiam opinion
15Professor Cox obviously shared this indignation, although he makes clear his
own view that outrage is not a substitute for a reasoned process of hearing and deliberation. Cox, supra note 37, at 8-9. Cox notes the ironic contrast between the precipitate
procedure adopted in Snepp, and the Pentagon Papers dissenters' protest against the
"frenetic haste" in that case which they thought rendered deliberation and reflection
impossible.
Professor Easterbrook, see supra note 51, believes the Court was correct not to
waste time when it had the arguments available to it through the briefs below. But
obviously, one briefs Snepp differently in the Fourth Circuit, with Marchettialready on
the books, than one does in the Supreme Court dealing with a point of first impression.
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in Snepp. In a footnote, the majority treated as self-evident the
existence of congressional authorization for the secrecy/censorship agreement under the "protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure" provision of the National Security Act of 1947.76 There was no discussion about
whether the broad language of the 1947 Act should be regarded
as an "express and appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior restraints"-the constitutional prerequisite, according to Justice White's Pentagon Papers opinion. 77 There
was no discussion of the relationship often required between
levels of statutory specificity and levels of constitutional suspectness. There was no discussion about whether any of the
legislative history suggested a congressional understanding that
it was authorizing a system of administrative censorship.
Most importantly, the per curiam opinion mentions nothing
about the first amendment; nor does it consider the possibility
that Snepp's publication might have value in terms of freedom
of expression. The argument that the agreement permitted the
CIA to "censor" its employees was handled in a footnote, with
the offhand rejoinder that "Snepp's contract ...

requires no

'78
more than a clearance procedure subject to judicial review.
The Court's opinion gave no sign that a prior restraint mechanism could conceivably pose any problem in terms of traditional
first amendment analysis.
Justice Stevens' dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, criticized the per curiam opinion on several grounds,
but gave no consideration to the question of legislative authority
for the prepublication clearance mechanism. 79 Separation of
powers considerations were thus entirely absent from both the
majority and dissent. This absence seems strange for a dissent
which criticizes the "uninhibited character of today's exercise
in lawmaking," and which expresses some surprise that "the
Court seems unaware of the fact that its drastic new remedy
has been fashioned to enforce a species of prior restraint on a

76

444 U.S. at 509 n.3, citing 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3).

77 403 U.S. at 731.
78 444 U.S. at 513 n.8.
79 Justice Stevens' dissent

focused on the inappropriateness of imposing a constructive trust. He also criticized the Court's decision "to dispose of this novel issue summarly." 444 U.S. at 517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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citizen's right to criticize his government."80 Stevens might have
added that Snepp was the first case in the history of the United
States in which the Supreme Court approved a prior restraint
against speech about government. 8 The majority opinion is designed to indicate that nothing of importance has transpired.
B. Travel Restrictions

The same push to executive empowerment marks the Su82
preme Court's performance in two other cases, Haig v. Agee
and Regan v. Wald,83 both of which uphold and legitimate discretionary executive action limiting Americans' rights to travel
freely in the world.
Unlike government secrecy agreements, the right to travel
has a long history.8 4 Judicial protection for an American citizen's
right to travel abroad, however, came long after the drafting of
the Constitution, and it came in a more complicated fashion
than did protection of domestic movement. 85 But since the

mId. at 526.

81The injunction issued against Snepp in the district court continued in effect and

was affirmed.
82 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
83 104 S. Ct. 3026, reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 285 (1984).
1 Although not mentioned in the Constitution's text, the Supreme Court, even
before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, found constitutional shelter for individuals' rights to freedom of movement within the United States. Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). In part, this solicitude for free movement reflected premises
of"Our Federalism" and, as such, constituted a legitimate inference from the structures
and relationships created by the Constitution. See C. Black, Structure and Relationship
in Constitutional Law (1968). In part it reflected the status of travel as a basic human
right, whose exercise is often the precondition for earning a living, maintaining family
ties, and generally engaging in "the pursuit of happiness." The right's significance in
the Anglo-American legal tradition traces back to Article 42 of the Magna Carta. See
generally Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787 (1956). Its contemporary importance is suggested by inclusion of provisions concerning the right in
the Helsinki Accord. See Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord
172-80 (Buergenthal ed. 1977).
I For most of our national history-from 1797 until 1952-two different legal traditions coexisted in relative harmony. The Secretary of State, as the holder of the
President's delegated authority, claimed and exercised broad power over the issuance
of passports. He granted them, denied them, and sought to impose conditions on their
use to facilitate the foreign relations of the United States. In the earliest period, the
Secretary acted without any statutory authorization, but since 1856, legislation has
granted the Secretary broad authority. Act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 52, 60-61.
Codified in 1926, the Passport Act reads: "The Secretary of State may grant and issue
passports ... under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe." Act of
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1950's, 86 a series of important judicial cases followed by congressional reactions moved the law quickly to recognize the status
of foreign travel as a constitutionally protected right, and to
surround it with protection akin to other constitutional rights.
Kent v. Dulles87 was the seminal case during this period. In
1952, under the open-ended language of the Passport Act of
1926,88 the Secretary of State issued regulations prohibiting the
granting of passports to Communist Party members. Kent invalidated these regulations. The Court was clearly influenced
by the historical transformation of the legal significance of passports from simple and often unnecessary "letters of introduction" to required exit permits- The Secretary's exercise of discretionary authority over the former was one thing; but that
kind of discretion over a document necessary for world travel
was quite another, and the Court wanted to make sure that
Congress had focused on that-issue.
Kent held that the right to travel was part of the "liberty"
protected by the fifth amendment's due process clause 89 and
rejected any notion that the President has special foreign affairs
power to broadly regulate foreign travel. If the "liberty" of travel
was to be regulated, Congress must do the job. 90
July 3, 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a). In 1978, an amendment limited the power to impose
area restrictions. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
At the same time, with limited wartime exceptions, no statute made it a criminal
offense to travel abroad without having a passport, and international practice did not
make possession of a passport a practical necessity of travel. Instead, the passport
served as a political document acknowledging the bearer's citizenship and requesting
foreign sovereigns to permit the bearer's safe passage.
8 The passage of § 215 of the Internal Security Act changed the situation in 1952.
Act of June 27, 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1982). That law made it a criminal offense to
leave the country without a passport, subject to whatever limitations and exceptions to
the prohibition the President might make. The law, in effect, reenacted wartime travel
controls that had been in place both in World War I and World War II, and made those
controls applicable for the duration of a presidentially declared emergency. Inasmuch
as the emergency was not occasioned by or limited to outright warfare, it had no logical
stopping point, and thus caused concern for the prolonged deprivation of the right to
travel abroad. In 1978, the criminal penalty was repealed.
357 U.S. 116 (1958).
s See supra note 85.
89 357 U.S. at 125.
90The Court said specifically:
If that "liberty" is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making
functions of the Congress. And if that power is delegated, the standards must
be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests. Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen,
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Instead of confronting the ultimate constitutional question
of how far Congress might limit the liberty to travel, however,
Kent focused on separation of powers and concluded that it
should not infer from open-ended statutory language alone that
Congress intended to give the Executive unbridled discretion
over an important liberty. The Court in Kent did not go so far
as to insist on explicit statutory authority as the predicate for
executive passport control; it was prepared to ground authorization in open-ended language if that language was bolstered by
longtime congressional acquiescence in the face of the actual
exercise of passport control by the Executive. Significantly,
though, the majority in Kent found no such history of previous
uses of executive passport control as to give an open-ended
statute and Congress' silence the character of authorization.
After Kent, concerns about limiting a citizen's right to exit
the country determined the outcome of four important cases in
the 1960's. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,91 the Court invalidated as overbroad a criminal statute prohibiting members of
registered Communist organizations to apply for or use passports because the statute lumped together all members, including those who posed some danger with those who did not. In
reaching this result, the Court characterized the right to travel
as "closely related" to the rights of speech and association 92 and
applied conventional first amendment tools to determine
overbreadth.
In the second case, Zemel v. Rusk,93 the Court upheld the
Secretary's refusal to issue a passport validated for travel in
Cuba, and found what had been lacking in Kent-a consistent
administrative practice of imposing area-bans on passports for
national security and foreign relations reasons. Congress was
thus seen implicitly to have ratified this executive position when
it enacted and re-enacted the Passport Act. The Court recogsuch as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers
that curtail or dilute them.
357 U.S. at 129 (citations omitted).
91378 U.S. 500 (1964).
9Id. at 517.
93381 U.S. 1 (1965).

1986]

Curtiss-WrightComes Home

nized that refusal to validate a passport would "act as a deterrent
to travel to that area, '94 but regarded the infringement on liberty
as legitimate in light of the coordinated effort of other nations
in the Western Hemisphere to discourage Cuban travel, as well
as the President's obligation to protect Americans unjustly deprived of liberty abroad. 95
Zemel, however, dealt only with the question of whether
the Secretary was prohibited from issuing passports with areabans; unlike Aptheker, it had nothing to do with the right to a
passport. Nor did Zemel address the question of travel control
through passports, that is, whether the Executive could punish
or restrict the movement of persons who went to Cuba either
with a passport containing an area-ban or without one at all.96
That important question was resolved against the government in United States v. Laub. 97 There, the Court ruled that it
was not a criminal offense to leave the country with a passport
and go to a destination where the passport was not valid. The
1967 decision, Lynd v. Rusk, 98 struck the final blow to executive
enforcement of area restrictions when it held that the Secretary
could not refuse to issue a passport to a citizen who planned to
travel to both restricted and unrestricted areas, so long as the
citizen agreed not to take the passport into the area for which
it had not been validated. 99
The judicially developed right to international travel thus
survived the tensions of the Vietnam War; the Executive ultimately abandoned enforcement of passport controls. In 1978,
Congress took steps to ratify those developments. It abolished
criminal penalties for traveling without a passport, even as it
94d. at 14.

95Id. at 15, construing 22 U.S.C. § 1732.
9 Id. at 3. Moreover, the Court treated foreign and domestic travel as involving
the same right, noting that since the right of domestic travel does not include unrestricted
travel to "areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilences" where such travels "directly and
materially interfere with safety and welfare of the area or the Nation as a wholet, so]
is it with international travel." 381 U.S. at 15-16. Zemel is obviously ignored by those
who regard foreign travel as a secondary right, more easily regulated than domestic
travel.
lu 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
9 Id. at 947. See Salans & Frank, Passportsand Area Restrictions, 20 Stan. L.
Rev. 839 (1968).
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imposed a general rule requiring a passport to leave the country;'0° and it amended the Passport Act to limit sharply the
Executive's authority to impose area restrictions. 10 1
1. Haig v. Agee'0 2
In Haig v. Agee, the Court abandoned this twenty-five year
history of legal protection for the right of foreign travel with its
sub-theme of lmited executive discretion. Although the Court
purportpd to-follow the earlier precedents, the language of Chief
Justice Burger's opinion cuts so deeply into the rights those
decisions accorded it is hard not to be cynical about the Court's
enterprise, whatever one thinks about the outcome of the case
on its unique facts. We can only hope that the context in which
executive power to limit travel was approved-national security
fears based upon the particular activities abroad of a renegade
CIA agent-will limit the broad reach of the Court's language. 0 3
Philip Agee was an ex-CIA agent bent upon doing what he
could to destroy the CIA's effectiveness. °0 By traveling abroad
and revealing intelligence techniques to expose the .CIA, he
flagrantly violated his legal obligations to the CIA as determined
by the courts, and his behavior was probably criminal. Nonetheless, the government did not indict him; it revoked his pass-

100
Act of June 27, 1952, as amended, Act of Oct. 7, 1978, 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1982).
The President may by waiver or exception limit the duty to have a passport on leaving
the country. Thus, passports are not required for travel to Canada.
101Act of Oct. 7, 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
102453 U.S. 280 (1981).
103Haig v. Agee may demonstrate the impossibility of bringing all security questions
under the rule of law. For example, the United States can presumably use whatever
means are necessary to stop terrorists who are illegally holding United States citizens
abroad. If an American citizen joins the terrorists, the government is not obliged because
of her citizenship, we would think, to act towards her in any special way.
104Although the Agee decision has much in common with Snepp, the motivations
of the two men should not be confused. Snepp saw himself as a patriotic critic of CIA
incompetence who took care to reveal nothing classified, while Agee set out to hamper
the CIA by exposing covert CIA agents operating in foreign countries.
For the purpose of litigation, Agee conceded that he was causing or likely to cause
serious damage, allowing the Court to make much of this concession. See, e.g., 453
U.S. at 287. By contrast, the government's concession in Snepp for litigation purposes
that no classified information was divulged by him, fell on deaf ears. 444 U.S. at 511.
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port without a prior hearing. 10 5 After reciting Agee's derelictions, Burger's opinion asserts that the issue is whether
Congress has authorized the challenged regulation. 106 Citing Zemel, the Court found that in light of the Passport Act's "broad
rule-making authority, 10 7 administrative constructions of the
statute are binding unless obviously wrong, adding that "this is
especially so in the areas of foreign power and national security,
where congressional silence is not to be equated with congressional disapproval. 1 0 8 Moreover, the opinion continued,
"[m]atters intimately related to foreign power and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention."' 10 9
The unacknowledged manipulation of precedent in these
passages is remarkable. First, although the Zemel Court found
specific congressional approval for area restrictions, it explicitly
rejected construing the Passport Act's "broad rule-making authority" to validate discretion secured by "mere congressional
inaction."' 10 Second, the idea that the government can withhold
a passport simply because Congress has not formally disapproved stands Kent on its head. Because liberty was involved,
Kent held, the Executive must trace authority to actual congressional approval, either through clear statutory language or
through acquiescence after actual executive exercise of power.
Kent is subtle, but the essence is that Steel Seizure controls.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, although relied on in Haig,
Curtiss-Wright itself says nothing about national security. Its
focus is on foreign relations. The Court hints, we fear, at the
expansion of Curtiss-Wrightto embrace executive authority to
act without explicit congressional authorization on domestic
national security secrecy problems.
In Kent, the Court found the central issue to be whether
there was a consistent executive practice of passport refusal,
,0- The Secretary acted pursuant to a regulation permitting such action where "the

Secretary determines that the national's activities abroad are causing or are likely to
cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States."
22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1984). The regulation was promulgated in 1966.
106In

a cautionary footnote, citing Curtiss-Wright's"sole organ" passage, Burger

states that the court has no occasion to consider whether the President might have this
power independent of Congress. 453 U.S. at 289 n.17. See supra note 103.
107Id.

at 291, citing Zemel, 381 U.S. at 12.

10 Id. at 291.
109Id. at 291-92,

citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.

110
381 U.S. at 11.
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specifically declining to validate executive claims about power
when those claims were accompanied only by mere congressional silence. In Agee, there were only three instances of executive action in thirty years, and only one that was taken
pursuant to the regulation here challenged. Yet the Agee Court
declared this remarkably infrequent exercise of power sufficient
to establish congressional authorization, simply because "there
have been few situations involving substantial likelihood of serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the
United States" as a result of a passport holder's activities
abroad. II
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Agee purported to follow
earlier precedents, but it is plain that Agee has more in common
with the dissents in Kent and Aptheker, and can draw no credible support from Zemel. Burger entirely ignored the fact that
after Kent, the Eisenhower Administration repeatedly called for
a statute to empower the Secretary to revoke passports for
security reasons, but Congress refused to enact such a law." 2
Apart from its treatment of the problem of congressional
authorization, Agee lays the groundwork for broad regulation
of travel, and for judicial refusal to review it. Kent and Aptheker
rested on the constitutional premise that freedom to travel was
an aspect of liberty protected by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. Agee, however, draws a sharp distinction between the right to travel within and without the United States,
and accords significant constitutional dimension only to the former. "3 Stating that "freedom to travel abroad... is subordinate
"1453 U.S. at 302. Is it probable that none of the private visits to and negotiations
in Vietnam were thought to create a serious risk to our foreign policy, or is it more
likely that the government failed to cancel passports because it felt its claimed power
would be rejected by the courts?
I2We agree with Professor Farber's conclusion in his recent article:
The Agee Court purported to find implicit congressional approval for travel
controls based on national security. Instead, the legislative record demonstrates
almost complete hostility to travel control for over twenty-five years before
Agee ....To infer congressional approval under these circumstances seems
to surpass the bounds of credibility.
Farber, National Security, the Right to Travel, and the Court, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 263,
284.
113
Kent, Aptheker, and Zemel each discussed the right of travel in terms that did

19861

Curtiss-Wright Comes Home

to national security and foreign policy considerations; as such,
it is subject to reasonable governmental regulation,"' 1 4 the opininion adds that in assessing reasonability, "no governmental
115
Nation."
the
of
security
the
than
compelling
more
terest is
There is judicial withdrawal on the first amendment front
as well, although the Court's message lies more in its dismissive
tone than in the result approved. Agee's passport was revoked
because of the content of his speech, and therefore his freedom
to travel, whatever its independent constitutional dimension,
raised a first amendment question directly. The Court categorically rejected Agee's first amendment claims since his statements had "the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel [and, as
such, were] clearly not protected by the Constitution."' 1 6 The
Court went on to hold that "[tihe mere fact that Agee is also
engaged in criticism of the Government does not render his
conduct beyond the reach of the law."117 Moreover, Burger held
that to revoke Agee's passport "'is an inhibition of action' rather
than of speech," citing the area restrictions approved of in Zemel." 8 But the point stressed in Zemel was precisely that the
executive action upheld in that case-refusal to validate passports for Cuban travel-was applied universally, not targeted at
particular persons because of their speech or political
associations.
Brennan's dissent, joined by Marshall, did not reach the
first amendment question, and relied instead on the view that
Congress had not authorized this executive revocation. But
not distinguish foreign domestic affairs, and suggested that the same broad criteria
would be applicable to the freedom to engage in either.
In severing the two, the Court relied on cases such as Califano v. Aznavorian, 439

U.S. 170, 176(1978), which concern the incidental effect of government benefit programs
on travel plans. Califano makes clear that durational residency requirements that triggered "right to travel" issues domestically do not have the same effect in a foreign

context. They do not, because "[tihe statutory provision in issue here does not have
nearly so direct an impact on the freedom to travel internationally as occurred in the

Kent, Aptheker, or Zemel cases." 439 U.S. at 177.
1 453 U.S. at 306.
115
Id. at 306-07.
"6Id. at 309.
117Id.
118
Id.
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Brennan was surely registering the important message of the
majority opinion when he referred to "the Court's whirlwind
treatment of Agee's constitutional claims. 11 9
The Court was probably correct in assessing some of Agee's
statements as unprotected under applicable constitutional tests
for judging speech that may cause violence or other great harm.
But the conclusory, impatient quality of the majority's treatmelit
of Agee's first amendment claims suggests an act of judicial
exasperation, not analysis. Agee clears the way for the Executive, not only by circumventing precedential requirements of
realistic legislative authorization, but also by ejecting the first
amendment from the premises.
The result of Haig v. Agee is that the Court has authorized
the Executive to act without a hearing by withdrawing the passport of any American citizen simply by claiming that his plans
represent a risk of serious injury to American foreign relations.
Without a passport, the citizen may well not be able to leave
the country. After the Executive acts, the administrative process
begins, and by the time it ends, who knows whether the circumstances that prompted the desire to travel will still be possible
of achievement. In Agee, bad facts made bad law.
120
2. Regan v. Wald

In Regan v. Wald, the Court faced a narrow issue of statutory construction. The 5-4 majority held that the President
still has the power under the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917 (TWEA) 12 1 to impose a near-total ban on transactions in
property in which Cuban nationals have an interest, a ban so

I9 Id. at 320 n.10 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).

110
104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).

M The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA) gave the President crisis
powers over trade in time of war or presidentially declared "national emergency." Act
of Oct. 6, 1917, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (1982). Once the President declared a "national
emergency" under the Act, emergency powers continued to exist until the President
declared the emergency terminated. As might be expected, Presidents often hesitated
to declare an end to national emergencies upon which their enhanced powers over trade
were conditioned. Indeed, the emergency declared in 1950 by President Truman in
response to the Korean conflict was still considered to exist in 1977 when Congress
sought to put this type of "emergency" power on a reasonable statutory foundation.
See infra note 123.
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one's own money to pay for
broad that it criminalizes spending
122
the ordinary expenses of travel.
In reaching this result, the Court refused to heed the clear
legislative intent of the 1977 International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA). 2 3 This law left intact the wartime powers
that the TWEA had conferred on the President but displaced
the TWEA with respect to peacetime national-emergency situations, and imposed upon the presidential emergency power a
number of new procedural restraints, such as consultation with
Congress.
The IEEPA preserved existing trade regulations based upon
the President's authority under the TWEA with a grandfather
clause in the 1977 Act declaring: "the authorities conferred upon
the president by [TWEA] which were being exercised with respect to a country on July 1, 1977 ... may continue .... "124
The question in Wald boiled down to whether the "authority"
preserved by the grandfathering statute only included authority
actually being exercised in 1977, or also included powers that
were not then in use. In other words, the language of the grandfathering statute permitted the view that if the President were
exercising "authority" to control trade in some specific respect,
he could continue to exercise that authority in other respects as
well, adjusting the particular terms of the control as he thought
the situation warranted. The legislative history strongly suggests, however, that Congress intended only to grandfather existing restrictions and not to preserve any open-ended authority
for wide-ranging executive action.
The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist simply overrode
the intent of Congress in order to permit the Executive to impose
general restrictions on travel to Cuba without going through the
122 104 S. Ct. at 3033-34, construing 50 U.S.C. § 5(b)(1)(B) (statute authorizing the
President to "regulate ... any ... transactions involving ... any property in which

any foreign country or national thereof has any interest").
123Act of Dec. 28, 1977, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982).
12450 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(1) (1982). The legislative

history of the 1977 grandfather

provision indicated that Congress did not wish to undo existing restrictions for various
reasons. Some members indicated that the President should not be forced to declare
new emergencies in order to maintain existing embargoes or asset freezes, as such

declarations might exacerbate international tensions. Others did not want to force the
President unilaterally to give up existing restrictions which might be bargaining chips.

Still others did not want Congress to get bogged down in partisan disputes about existing
restrictions. See Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3035-38.
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congressional notice and consultation requirement imposed by
the 1977 Act for new peacetime emergencies. As Justice Powell
stated in his dissent, the result reached "may well be in the best
interest of the United States [but] the legislative history ...
unmistakably demonstrates that Congress intended to bar the
President from expanding the exercise of emergency authority
")125

Wald, like Agee, gives no weight to the value of foreign
travel as a right. Instead, Wald confirms that foreign travel is a
"freedom," not a "right," and then discusses it as if it were
merely a privilege. Zemel was cited as authority to restrict travel
to a particular area, with no discussion of the fact that Zemel
did not concern criminalizing travel regulations.126 Most importantly, Wald refuses to infer limits on unchecked executive discretion to regulate travel through "trade" controls from the fact
that Congress in 1978 amended the Passport Act to limit standardless executive imposition of area restraints on Americans'
travel.
The result in Wald does not have the far-reaching potential
for executive suppression of first amendment freedoms that
Snepp and Agee embody, but it does demonstrate the push to
executive empowerment at the expense of congressional control
that marks the Supreme Court's recent exposure to national
security secrecy and freedom to travel issues.
III. Criminal Revelations: Espionage and Theft of Information
in the Shadows of Congressional Intent
A. Covert Espionage
James Stephen observed that "malice aforethought," the
criminal state of mind that distinguished murder from manslaughter, had gained its legal content according to judges' views
of the propriety of hanging particular defendants. 127 So is it also

104 S. Ct. at 3049 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Zemel Court expressly declined to reach the question. 381 U.S. at 13.
127James Stephen, Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1866, Q.21 10, cited in Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-53, § 75 (1953).
125
126
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with the United States law on criminal revelations of national
defense information. In response to aggressive executive claims
about its scope, the Judiciary is shaping the law to facilitate the
prosecution of covert espionage. Whether or not the Supreme
Court's summary treatment of legislative materials has influenced the lower federal courts, those courts too, for one reason
or another, seem determined that problems of statutory drafting
and legislative intent should not stand in the way of effective
prosecutions.
The Fourth Circuit's recent en banc decision in United
States v. Smith 128 provides a striking illustration. Smith, a former
employee of the Army Intelligence Security Command (INSCOM) admitted that he sold classified defense information to
a Soviet agent in Japan. The information concerned five INSCOM double-agent operations. His sole defense was that he
believed he was assisting the United States according to the
wishes of the CIA. He claimed that two men persuaded him
with their knowledge of operational procedures that they were
working for the CIA, 129 and that he could help them set up a
new double-agent project by revealing outdated information to
the Soviets. One gathers that the true identities and whereabouts
of these men are unknown, and the CIA says it had never heard
of them. 130 Smith wanted to testify about what these men told
him and why in light of his intelligence experiences he believed
them. Quite plainly, Smith's credibility improved the more he
fully disclosed how CIA espionage operations work, and how
these operations are sometimes run by individuals who work
under hidden and flexible arrangements with the Agency so that
the Agency can "disown" them, if necessary. The government
characterized the entire story as a preposterous invention, noting that it was never mentioned during Smith's lengthy preliminary interrogations .131
Permitting Smith to tell his full story, whether it was true
or not, would have opened the door to wide-ranging disclosures
1- 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985).
12 United

States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424, 428 (E.D. Va. 1984).
110Id. at 430 n.5.
'31 Id. at 434. Whether or not it was false, it persuaded a jury. At the criminal trial
following the proceeding here described, Smith was acquitted on April 11, 1986. See
N.Y. Times, April 12, 1986, § 1, at 6, col. 5.

388

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 21

of classified informatibn.132 Acting under the recently enacted
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 133 Smith gave
notice to the government of his intention to disclose classified
information at trial. 34 In response, the government sought pretrial rulings to prevent the admission of some of his testimony.
In a well-reasoned opinion, the trial court held that Smith's
beliefs, if credited, would be a valid defense to the charges
against him. 35 If Smith believed they were authorized CIA
agents, then he did not act with the culpability required under
the espionage statutes, whether or not the men worked for the
CIA, or even for the Soviets. Moreover, the court proposed to
admit as relevant evidence his testimony on a variety of classified matters, even where there was only an attenuated link
between the evidence and the existence of the two men. The
trial court believed it lacked authority, under the law of evidence, to refuse to admit relevant testimony on the sole ground
that the testimony would reveal classified secrets.
In particular, the court also could not balance the importance of the information to Smith's defense against the harm
public disclosure was likely to cause. That CIPA itself grants
no such authority has been clear to each court that has considered the case. 13 6 The trial court ruled further that it could not,
consistent with Smith's right to a jury trial, exclude testimony
132The belief that conduct was authorized by the CIA has been raised as a defense
in other criminal cases, but not with such factual specificity. See, e.g., United States
v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979).
1
18 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (Supp. 1985).
134 Congress patterned this duty to notify the government upon legislation obliging
a defendant to reveal in advance of trial an alibi defense. The government can then
Invoke CIPA's procedures to ascertain in advance of trial the admissibility of a defendant's proposed testimony and seek ways to limit the possible damage to security
interests.
135 592 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1984) (Williams, J.). The opinion is notable for its
clear discussion of mistake of law problems.
136 Congress intended CIPA to provide procedures which would enable the government both to evaluate the substantiality of a defendant's threat to disclose classified
information and to seek alternatives to disclosure-such as a government stipulation or
the admission of a summary of the evidence rather than the evidence itself. It did not
change the substantive law of evidence relating to admissibility or relevance. See United
States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1111-13 (4th Cir. 1985) (Butzner, J., dissenting). The
Conference Report on CIPA issued by the House Select Committee on Intelligence
states that "nothing ... is intended to change the existing standards for determining
relevance and admissibility." H.R. Rep. No. 1436, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4307, 4310.
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on the alternative ground
urged by the government that his story
1 37
was very likely false.

The government took an interlocutory appeal under § 7 of
CIPA, seeking to overturn or limit these rulings. A panel of the
Fourth Circuit affirmed1 38 in an opinion later vacated by the
139
court of appeals sitting en banc.
The court's en banc opinion is provocative. First, portions
of the printed opinion itself are classified 140 in order to preserve
the secrecy of the classified information that the government

did not want Smith to testify about. Classifying judicial opinions
is consistent with CIPA.1 41 It makes little sense to go through
an elaborate in camera judicial process only to have the published report of the case tell the whole story. Yet, there is a real
tension in trying to accomodate the central requisites of the
open administration'of justice with this kind of secrecy. In particular, it is hard to evaluate the factual premises of secret law.
From a legislative perspective, the problem resembles whether
a general necessity defense should be enacted in order to ameliorate the law's harshness, when, for example, ordinary rules
regulate the actions of men in a lifeboat adrift at sea. Concessions made to necessity in a special, largely unknown context
might be later generalized to apply to other contexts. Once
loosed, the idea of secrecy in criminal proceedings may prove
hard to cabin. Thus, it is genuinely unsettling to open an advance
sheet in the Federal Reporter and confront a footnote which
1 42
reads in its entirety: "(Parts of this footnote are classified.)."
What happened to the parts that were not classified? Did classification swallow themil too?
137592 F. Supp. at 434.
138United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1984).

'39
780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985).
140Id. at 1105-06. Parts of the trial court's opinion are also classified. See 592 F.
Supp. at 443.

141"[T]he Federal courts shall in each case involving classified information adopt
procedures to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information." 18
U.S.C. § 9(b) (Supp. 1985).
,42
780 F.2d at 1105 n.6, 1106 n.9. Did the difficulty of deciding just which parts of
the footnote are properly classifed prompt the decision to classify all of it? Are parts

of the footnote that clearly do not reveal classified information suppressed now, in order
to forestall study of the printed volume to see the contexts in which more information

is now available than was initially released, thus revealing the points of concern? Is it
a misprint? One can see a world-the inevitable dynamic of a secrecy system, including
the paranoia it induces in observers-in this tiny grain of sand.
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The en banc opinion is also provocative because the court
construes the Federal Rules of Evidence to require the trial
court to weigh the importance of an individual's testimony to
his defense against the harm that testimony might do to the
government by revealing secrets . 143 Smith was permitted to testify that the two men said they were CIA agents, and that he
believed them. But he was not permitted to testify about some
of his collateral knowledge about the CIA which, he alleged,
made him think the two men were credible. Because some of
the opinion is classified, one cannot tell just what Smith was
able to testify to and what he was not.
In reaching that result, the court of appeals made applicable
to the espionage context the Roviaro'44 principle, which permits
the government to decline to reveal particular facts concerning
government informants and operations unless a balance of considerations requires it. There is a world of difference, however,
between permitting the government to withhold information
which the defendant hopes will either bolster his case or hurt
the government's case and prohibiting the defendant from testifying about what he claims to know.
If there is any other context in law where a privilege forces
someone to remain silent about what he knows when the holder
of the privilege is trying to harm him and the evidence would
tend to exculpate, we are ignorant of it. Nonetheless, the Fourth
Circuit managed to extract this conclusion not from CIPA, but
from the prior law of evidence. In so doing, the court refused
to draw any conclusion from the fact that neither the Executive
nor the Congress believed that the pre-CIPA rules of evidence
authorized the kind of balancing approach that the government
here secures. Indeed, the Executive specifically sought authority to balance national security interests against classified defense testimony, 45 and Congress refused to grant it.146 But, like

"'

780 F.2d at 1107.

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
S. 1482: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980) (prepared statement of
Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General), cited in 780 F.2d at 111 (Butzner, L,
dissenting).
146 S. Rep. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprintedin 1980 U.S. Code
Cong. &
Ad. News 4294, 4303, cited in 780 F.2d at 1112 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
14

145Graymail,
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the recent Supreme Court cases, Smith's message is that if you
can't get it from Congress, the courts are always in session.
The final twist is that the court of appeals rejected Smith's
pleas that the trial court be told to make use of the procedures
of § 6 of CIPA to require some accommodation by the government, such as abstracting the evidence to preserve classified
secrets while still allowing its thrust to be heard. Ironically, the
Fourth Circuit said that that balancing would ignore congressional intent that CIPA not alter the prior law of evidence. 147
The court did not discuss the fact that the government itself had
urged this use of CIPA before the panel of the court of appeals,
when the issue before the court was Smith's right to testify fully
and the government was seeking ways to limit the damage.
Thus, relevant evidence which is inadmissible (because, if
spread on the record in its entirety, the government would be
harmed more than the defendant helped) cannot be made admissible by requiring the government to abstract evidence, even
if that abstraction is easily done and will keep the government
148
from being harmed at all.
Other recent case law developments also seem to pass
lightly over serious problems of congressional intent. 18 U.S.C.
§ 798 bars any revelation, including publication, of classified
communications intelligence. In United States v. Boyce, 49 the
Ninth Circuit determined that a defense of improper classification would not be allowed in a prosecution under this statute,
citing a prior holding that construed a wholly different statute
punishing disclosures of classified information by government
employees to foreign agents. 150 The Boyce court ignored the fact
that the Conference Report, the clearest statement in the legis-

,47
780 F.2d at 1109.

149 Whether anything could be done on the evidence at issue in Smith, we do not
know. The court's holding, however, does not make that issue relevant. Nor does the

court explain how the trial court will ascertain the dimensions of the national security

damage to be feared. The government, presumably, cannot just show up claiming that
information is classified and likely to cause damage if revealed. It will have to explain
why information is important. CIPA is structured to avoid the necessity of such

revelations.

1- 594 F.2d

1246 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1980).

,so Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1963), construing 50 U.S.C.
§ 783(b). The major differences between 18 U.S.C. § 798 and 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) are
discussed in Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 3, 1064-74.
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lative history of § 798, states that "the classification must be in
fact in the interests of national security.''
In United States v. Dedeyan, 52 the Fourth Circuit upheld
the conviction of a civilian under 18 U.S.C. § 793(f)(2), a provision which requires that one report to a "superior officer" the
loss or abstraction of a defense-related document. But the defendant had no superior officer-he was a civilian employee.
And the court gave no indication of who the "superior officer"
might be.
Finally, in United States v. Zehe, 153 the district court in
Massachusetts recently held that the espionage statutes apply
extraterritorially not only to United States citizens but to all
foreigners as well, without regard to whether the foreigner has
had any contact with persons acting inside the United States.
This decision at least claims to implement Congress' intent when
in 1961, Congress took action and repealed 54 a law limiting the
reach of the espionage statutes to "the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States and on the high seas, as well
as within the United States.' 55 According to this construction,
however, foreign intelligence officers all over the world are
committing offenses under United States law as they sift through
whatever "information relating to the national defense"' 56 of the
United States that their fellow workers have managed to secure
57
for their analysis.1
The problem with these espionage cases is not that persons
are being convicted frivolously of espionage, or that we are in
the midst of some McCarthy-esque spy scare. Rather, the problem is that the same statutory language that is given such expansive effect in order to fashion a tough law of covert espionage

151
S.Rep. No. 111, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1949); H.R. Rep. No. 1895, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess, 3 (1950) (emphasis added).
152584 F.2d 36, 40 (4th Cir. 1978).
' 601 F. Supp. 196 (D. Mass. 1985).
'S Act of Oct. 4, 1961, repealing 18 U.S.C. § 791.
"'Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 791.
15618 U.S.C. §§ 794(a), (c).
"17Inasmuch as United States v. Heimlich, 704 F.2d 547 (11th Cir. 1984), holds that
no statute of limitations applies to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a), these foreigners do
well to keep out of the United States' jurisdiction.
See also United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1984), where the court
issued mandamus to keep a district judge from conducting an espionage trial as a capital
case over the objection of the United States.
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is also applicable to government employees participating in the
traditional practice of leaking national security information in
order to shape policy. The statutory prohibitions might also
apply to reporters and newspapers-newspaper employees, for
example, could be prosecuted as aiders and abettors of a government employee's press leak. Yet making criminal this kind
of behavior would be a marked change in the tradition of United
States information controls, and it would be entirely inconsistent
with congressional intent over the years.
B. Criminality of Public Revelations
1. The Legislation
Shortly after the PentagonPapers decision, we undertook
an analysis of the application of the espionage statutes to publication of information bearing on national defense and national
security. 58 We assumed that a generally coherent picture would
emerge from study of the statutory texts, legislative history,
judicial glosses on the texts and their histories, and the repeated
efforts of Congress and the Executive to deal with the problems
of leaks and press disclosures. We were wrong. The espionage
statutes are incomprehensible if read according to the conventions of legal analysis of text, while paying fair attention to
legislative history. This is especially true of the sections relating
to publication of defense information and the preliminary acts
of information-gathering and communication. 159 Although we
158See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 3.

159In order to explain how they may be applied to government employees and
newspapers, it is important to briefly describe the espionage statutes. Broad and amorphous espionage laws have been on the books since 1917, and are found in §§ 793 and
794 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Subsections 794(a) and 793(a) and (b) collectively

criminalize gathering for and communicating to foreigners "information respecting the
national defense" if done with "intent or reason to believe that the information is to be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation." These

provisions do not explicitly cover "publishing," although gathering and communicating
information are obvious prerequisites to publication. Subsection 794(b), on the other
hand, does explicitly apply to publication. It prohibits, among other things, publishing

national defense information in time of War with intent to communicate it to the enemy.
Subsections 793(d) and (e), by far the most confusing provisions, prohibit "willful"
communication of national defense information to persons "not entitled to receive it."
They also prohibit unlawful retention of such information.
These statutes were enacted after a series of legislative debates and amendments
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continue to believe that it was not mistaken in its essentials, our
1973 effort to rationalize the espionage statutes was both interminable and almost absurd in the confusion it depicted. We have
no wish to reiterate that effort, particularly since the Comment
which follows sets out the general analysis. However, we do
wish to highlight the basic problems because it is important to
understand that the Executive's recent efforts to apply the
murky espionage statutes to government employees-possibly
leading to prosecution for press publications-has been aided
by a Judiciary equally unwilling to construe the statutes more
narrowly. The implications of this executive-judicial partnership
are especially disturbing in cases such as United States v. Morison,160 which raise genuine civil liberties concerns.
Although the espionage statutes present a fantastic array of
interpretation problems, there are four key issues. First,
§ 794(b) punishes wartime publication of defense information
with "intent" to communicate to the enemy. May such an intent
be inferred from general publication in a newspaper that its
reporters know will be read by the enemy? After examining the
legislative history in 1973, we thought not. The Wilson Administration in 1917 proposed a comprehensive set of statutes designed to protect defense information during World War I, resting on essential and sweeping provisions for executive
information control. One such provision would have given the
President power either to censor prior to, or punish after the
fact-exactly which was never entirely clear-publication of any
information relating to the military that was generally covered
by presidential directives. Congress firmly rejected this provision after much debate about the dangers of a president's manipulating public opinion and the valiie of publication of military
which are fairly read as rejecting criminal sanctions for publication of information
designed to inform the public. This was so no matter what damage to national security
might ensue, and regardless of whether a well-meaning publisher knew that a by-product
of disclosure would be damage to the national interest. In the 1917 debates, Congress
repeatedly assured both itself and the press that the statutes under consideration would
not bar press revelations. Revisions in 1950 were undertaken with similarly explicit and
uncontradicted statements of immunity for the press. The trouble is that, notwithstanding Congress' intentions, one has to strain to read the language of §§ 793 and 794 in
such a way as to immunize publication of defense-related information; similarly, only a
tortured reading of the statutes would save from criminal prosecution the collection and
retention of information preliminary to such publication.
11o604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985).,
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information to informed policy choices in a democracy. Enacted
in its place was the prohibition now codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 794(b). To give effect to Congress' rejection of what was then
known as "the censorship proposal," we concluded that the
intent formulation of § 794(b) must be read to require a purpose
to communicate to the enemy-the sort of mental state that a
spy would have. Yet the surprising result of this reading is that
§ 794(b)'s explicit prohibition on publication is so limited as to
be, in practical effect, a nullity.
Second, § 794(a) prohibits communication of defense information to foreigners, and §§ 793(a) and (b) prohibit gathering
information if done "with intent or reason to believe that the
information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or
to the advantage of any foreign nation." A reporter who gathers
defense information for publication would seem to violate these
provisions, and yet leaders in the congressional debates repeatedly insisted that it was not their aim to punish newspapers for
publishing defense information in the interests of informed national debate. A baffling question of interpretation is therefore
raised by these provisions, particularly those pertaining to newsgathering. One argument is that these statutes do not reach
publication because the word "publishes," used in § 794(b), is
absent here. This argument is fraught with difficulties, however,
because immunity would have to extend not merely to publication but also to those who act in contemplation thereof, such
as employees who seek to publish damaging security information. Moreover, what is a publication? Does it include a conversation with a friend? Does it include a government employee
who leaks information to the press?
Third, the meaning of §§ 793(d) and (e) is especially troublesome. The subject of much dicta in the opinions of several
Justices in the Pentagon Papers decision, § 793(e) prohibits
anyone in unauthorized possession of any document relating to
the national defense from delivering or communicating it to
someone not entitled to receive it. The same subsection also
prohibits the willful retention of any tangible defense information and the failure to deliver it to a United States officer entitled
to receive it. Section 793(d) is similar, but applies to lawful
possessors. The legislative history of these provisions indicates
that Congress did not understand them to criminalize conduct
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engaged in for publication purposes. But how they can be-narrowed to effectuate this understanding is a mystery. Unlike the
other espionage provisions, they do not expressly require that
the actor be motivated by a desire to injure the United States
or advantage foreign nations.
Fourth, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (e), and several other parts
of the espionage laws, make behavior criminal only if national
defense information is transferred to "any person not entitled
to receive it." The question is, what body of law determines
this entitlement? An obvious answer is the classification system,
but that answer must overcome the objection that Congress, at
the time of enacting the espionage statutes, rejected the Wilson
administration's proposal to grant the President authority to
designate what was to be defined as "defense information," and
who was "entitled to receive it." To permit classification to
determine entitlement in effect gives back to the Executive what
was earlier denied. Moreover, to this date, Congress has never
explicitly authorized the classification system, although it has
implicitly recognized its legitimacy by enacting numerous statutes that assume its existence.' 6 ' But Congress has not been
prepared to make simple transfer of classified information a
criminal offense.
2. The Morison Case
In United States v. Morison, a government employee was
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) by having "willfully"
communicated to a British military journal, Jane's Defense
Weekly, copies of photographs taken by reconnaissance satellite. He was also convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) for
having kept intelligence documents at home. Relying on the
Fourth Circuit's earlier opinion in United States v. Dedeyan,162
the trial court explicitly stated that the question of who is "not
entitled to receive" defense information could be resolved by
reference to the classification system. 163 Moreover, in construing
the statutory prohibition against communicating a photograph
161See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 798; 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
162584
"6

F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1978).
See supra text accompanying note 161.
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relating to the national defense, the court in effect transformed
the elements of the crime, substituting "which is properly classified" for "relating to the national defense." The court held that
the government need not show that the defendant knew that a
classified document was in fact defense-related rather than improperly classified. Knowledge of the fact of classification was
itself sufficient. In response to the defense's argument that the
legislative history of § 793 demonstrates that Congress intended
to punish spies and not leakers, the Morison court stated blithely
that Congress could have considered someone a spy who took
information gained in government employment and "released it
to the world." 164
The Morison court also relied heavily on the Dedeyan decision to define the scienter requirements in the statute. Dedeyan construed 18 U.S.C. § 793(f)(2) to require "knowledge of
illegal abstraction, ' and therefore rejected the claim that the
description of "information" covered by this statute was too
vague.1 65 What the Dedeyan court meant by this "knowledge"
is uncertain. If the court meant that the government must prove
that a defendant knew of the document's illegal abstraction, the
government must show that the defendant knew that the document "related to the national defense". Such a reading, however,
puts the government in a difficult position because the defendant
can claim that he knew that the government considered a document to be defense-related, but that he did not similarly view
the document. The government would then have the heavy
166
burden of proving that a defendant is lying about his beliefs.
16

604 F. Supp. at 659.

The Court in Dedeyan upheld a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 793(f)(2) for failing
to report that a classified document had been, with the defendant's knowledge, photographed by a Soviet representative to the United States. Dedeyan had himself prepared
the document and stamped it secret. He mounted vagueness and overbreadth attacks
against the critical statutory term "information related to the national defense"--the
language which the espionage laws use to define information that cannot be transferred.
In theory, this language does not refer to classified information, inasmuch as the phrase
was on the books and interpreted by case law before the classification system was ever
developed. Instead it means information broadly related to military affairs. The Dedeyan
court rejected the defendant's claim that 18 U.S.C. § 793(f)(2) was unconstitutionally
vague, despite the law's failure to require a subversive intent. The court noted
"[s]ubsection (f)(2) does contain a scienter requirement: knowledge of the document's
illegal abstraction." 584 F.2d at 39. See discussion in Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 3,
974-91.
16 There also is the possibility of a mistake of law defense, that is, an assertion by
"6
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The Morison court read Dedeyan as requiring only knowledge of the fact of abstraction, and not its illegal character, and
tried to fashion a similar rule for § 793(e). The jury was asked
whether the materials Morison transferred related to the national
defense, and whether he had "willfully" communicated them, in
breach of his duty to maintain security. 167 The jury was not
asked to decide whether Morison had knowledge of their defense-related status, above and beyond the fact of their classification. Moreover, the court's analysis was internally contradictory. In a published opinion holding inadmissible any
evidence of Morison's patriotism, the court first stated that
"[n]ational defense is not a subjective test; it does not matter
whether the defendant himself believed that the photographs
1
and/or documents did indeed relate to the national defense."'
But the court went on to say that "a showing of willfulness [the
statutory standard] only requires that he knew he was doing
something prohibited by law."' 169 Inasmuch as the crime is one
of transferring defense information, not classified information,
he could not "know" he was violating the law if he held the
belief that the court had described as immaterial-i.e., if he
believed that the classified information was not in fact defenserelated. In effect, the court makes the transfer of classified
information a material element of the crime, providing only that
misclassification in fact will serve as a defense.
The remaining policy question is where to draw limits
around what classified information is encompassed by the statutes. In Dedeyan, for example, the court had charged the jury
that the law required the government to show how the information's disclosure might be "potentially damaging" to the national defense or "might be useful" to an enemy. 170 It seems that
the defendant that he does not understand the criteria to be used in determining what
information "relates to the national defense." Presumably that defense would be invalid
on the conventional ground that ignorance of the law is not a defense. But see Liparota
v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 2084 (1985), where the majority accepts a mistake of law
defense and suggests that failure to do so would convert an ordinary crime into one of
strict liability!
167
See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 919 (4th Cir. 1980).
I's United States v. Morison, 622 F. Supp. 1009, 1010 (D. Md. 1985).
169Id.

,70The Dedeyan court characterized as a "limiting [jury] instruction" one that
focused attention on whether information had been made public by Congress or the
Department of Defense and is found in sources "lawfully" available to the general
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the government will always be able to prove this if information
is both classified and secret. Indeed, the "might be useful"
standard is no limit whatever if the "use" a foreign nation may
make of information is simply to confirm information they already know, including their suspicions about how well they have
penetrated our security system. Interestingly, the difficulty of
judicial or jury evaluation of whether a particular revelation of
classified information indeed worked damage to the national
interest presents the same problems of proof that have led, in
general first amendment theory, to reject tests that try to ascertain whether particular speech will cause harm.
In rejecting the overbreadth defense, the trial judge in Morison implemented the holding of the court of appeals in Dedeyan. In effect, military relatedness and proof of the government's attempt to keep the information secret, are all the
government need show. Indeed, under Morison, it is ironic that
persons who reveal information publicly have a harder time
defending themselves than spies because, unlike spies, their
conduct makes the information available to everyone; they may
provide Tobago with knowledge about United States defense
matters that the Soviet Union has long possessed. Thus, for
government employees at least, the Morison court creates a
general crime of willful revelation of classified information,
which Congress has consistently refused to enact when asked
to do so by the Executive.
Whether or not the United States should have a military
secrets act applicable to government employees, or to everyone
else as well, is obviously a complex proposition that cannot
simply be rejected out of hand. Too many thoughtful and experienced people support the idea for it to be one without any
merit. Moreover, the idea that government employees can
rightly claim a privilege to choose for themselves when to make
-secrets public is, we think, preposterous. Any such privilege, if
regularly exercised, will lead inevitably to a concentration of

public, or alternatively, where the sources of information are lawfully available to the
public, and the United States and the Department of Defense have made no effort to
guard the information. On this instruction, the fact that information is widely available
despite government effort to suppress it is of no consequence, so long as the information
could provide advantage to some foreign country.
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power in the hands of those few people whose unquestioned
personal loyalty to their superiors makes them a safe security
risk. No one can believe that will result in either better government or heightened security. There is also the ever present
possibility that an employee may not realize why certain seemingly insignificant information is important for security purposes. The number of opportunities to slip up, and the cracks
in the system no matter how well it is managed, must understandably make intelligence officers charged with securing sensitive information extremely nervous people.
On the other hand, the courts' approach to this problem,
both on the civil side in Snepp and Marchetti, as well as in
criminal cases like Morison, is inadequate. Constitutional difficulties aside, the courts' rush to give the espionage statutes the
broadest possible application overlooks the relationship of employee revelations to the system of information management.
There exists a complex relationship between the national media,
the executive branch and its allies, and those who oppose the
administration in power. The ability of the press to shape the
national agenda by the manner in which it selects, pursues, and
treats stories is well-known. An effort to manage the press'
perception of the problems is thus an indispensible aspect of
effective executive leadership, since the President wants the
press to tell the story "in the right way." On the other hand, the
system mandates that those with a competing agenda make it
their responsibility to see that the Executive does not tell the
story its way, particularly not by hiding any skeletons. In the
United States, we have no mechanism of parliamentary inquiry
obliging the Executive to reveal its bad news. Thus, leak and
counterleak by government employees have become an integral
part of the way people with power talk to one another. It is this
problem, as well as first amendment concerns, that make Congress so reluctant to enact any thoroughgoing secrecy program.
Moreover, it is not clear that the press publishes everything
it learns. After all, we are assured that the secrets that most
concerned the government in the Pentagon Papers case were
never published.171 Similarly, it is a gross exaggeration to say,

17

Griswold, Teaching Alone is not Enough, 25 J. Legal Educ. 251 (1973).
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as in Morison, that the damage done to the national security by
public release of military secrets is equivalent, or even worse
than, damage through transfer of information by spies. For some
kinds of secrets that might be true, but for the vast majority of
them, knowledge that the secret is out sharply limits the damage
done. The greatest damage occurs when the government believes that "secrets are secret"--particularly communications
intelligence systems-when in fact they are not. In that situation, the government is easy prey to tactics that take advantage
of its predispositions and biases. Indeed, one lesson we should
draw from the recent spate of espionage prosecutions is that if
the dark figure of criminology-the relation of the true offense
rate to the reported crime rate-is as true for espionage as for
other crimes, there are many more spies out there than we have
been able to apprehend.
"I Finally, why do we assume that foreign intelligence officers
can rely on the truth of what appears in the press? If we cannot
tell whether or not a defecting KGB officer was acting out a
Soviet disinformation scheme, why should we suppose that the
Soviets regard as fully credible the reports that appear in the
media, whether they concern weaponry, covert action, or our
success or failure in breaking their codes?
Given the clarity of the legislative history indicating that
Congress never intended that the espionage statutes should
reach publication, and given Congress' repeated refusal to put
criminal penalties behind the classification system, one would
think that courts would exercise caution in applying the statutes
to employee press leaks.
C. Theft of Information
It is our judgment that the Supreme Court would, and
should, uphold some military secrets law if Congress enacted
one applicable to government employees. On the other hand,
an "Official Secrets Act" criminalizing all publication of secret
facts about the government, whether or not related to national
security matters, must be held unconstitutional unless we are
willing to abandon large portions of our first amendment jurisprudence. Nonetheless, lower courts, interpreting 18 U.S.C.
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§ 641,1 7which prohibits theft, conversion, or unauthorized disposition of government property, are laying the groundwork for
transforming that act into its British counterpart. This not only
raises the gravest constitutional problems, but also flatly contravenes congressional intent. Indeed, there is no more important question about the extent to which the courts will fashion
secrecy policy with Congress in the wings than whether or not
§ 641 will be construed to reach an employee's unauthorized
transfer of government information, or copies of government
documents. The statute parallels ordinary larceny prohibitions
by punishing the person who deprives another of the economic
value of his property by wrongfully taking it away, as well as
the person who steals for his own use.
Presumably the statute reaches without question the actual
taking of a document, when the government loses possession of
papers prepared for its use and in which it has a property
interest. That was the situation in United States v. Kampiles, 73
which resulted in the defendant's conviction under § 641, as
well as for espionage, because he transferred a technical manual
concerning satellite photography systems. Kampiles did not
copy the manual-he simply took it from his place of employment at the CIA's office in Virginia. While affirming his conviction on multiple counts, the Seventh Circuit failed to discuss
§ 641.
17

Public money, property or records, 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1985):

Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or
the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any
record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any
department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under
contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert to
his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or
convertedShall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exeed the sum of
$100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
The word "value" means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either
wholesale, or retail, whichever is greater.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 725.
1" 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979).
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Three critical issues concerning § 641's application to unauthorized transfer of documents, and information contained in
documents, must be considered. The first is to determine the
liability attaching to duplicating and transferring government
documents in a manner contrary to the government's instructions-whether those instructions are set out by statute, regulation or simply as part of an employment contract. Where
copies were made of FBI records by persons using government
equipment and paper, and acting on government time, the Third
Circuit has upheld a § 641 conviction on the theory that the
government owns the copies as well as the original. 174 The question is then whether the papers should be valued at the cost of
the paper the government lost or, alternatively, at the amount
someone might pay for the document. Conventional larceny
analysis suggests the latter; market value controls.
The virtue of this theory is that prosecution does not turn
on the government's right to exclusive control over information.
Taking the government's blank paper would also be a crime.
However, the virtue of the approach is also its vice: Is it proper
to link information controls to the private use of a copying
machine-an offense committed daily by hundreds of thousands
of employees? Punishing conduct in which everyone engages,
and leaving it to officials to choose those whom it wishes to
penalize, is inconsistent with fundamental principles of criminal
law. Such a wide-open statutory construction is simply an invitation to unconstitutionally motivated selective prosecution.
The second critical issue regarding § 641 is whether the
government can claim that one who copies and then transfers
the copy. to another has sold or disposed of a "thing of value"
belonging to the United States. 75 Under this hypothesis, the
government has lost no document, since all of its original papers
remain in its possession. However, it may be claimed that the
transferred item contained, and therefore the government has
lost, an intangible "thing of value"-namely the information
whose secrecy the government sought to maintain. The term

174United States v. Digilio,
175See supra note 172.

538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976).
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"thing of value" is commonly used in legislation to cast a broad
net of liability, and is frequently construed to include intangi177
bles. 76 In the related setting of United States v. Bottone,
Judge Friendly construed 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which prohibits
transporting "goods stolen or taken by fraud," to cover photocopies of documents that remained with their owners. In general, as the protection of information becomes a key part of the
legal regime in an information economy, its protection under
general legislation will become even more commonplace.
The question then becomes whether it makes any difference
that it is government information at stake when determining
whether information is a "thing of value." Congress has rejected
any notion of copyright in government expression. 78 Does that
imply that government "information," no matter how expressed,
ought not be considered a "thing of value," even though as a
practical matter government information is something that people will pay for? At least two cases, neither of which deals with
espionage problems, treat government information as a thing of
value. The first case permitting a conviction on this theory was
United States v. Friedman,179 where the revelation of grand jury
testimony was held a violation of § 641. In the second case,
United States v. Girard,80 the court construed § 641 to criminalize the sale of agency files by a Drug Enforcement Agency
official.
The third critical issue involving § 641 is how to determine
who acts "without authority" within the meaning of its prohibition on sale or disposition. In Girard,the court permitted the
Drug Enforcement Agency's (DEA) rules and regulations to
delimit and clarify the concept of "authority." If "without authority" can mean simply that a defendant did not obey DEA
rules, there is no reason why the same theory cannot make
criminal the transfer of a copy of a document which the government, under its ordinary housekeeping authority, has directed
176See, e.g., the cases cited in United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979).
1"365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).

17817 U.S.C. § 105.

179445 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jacobs v. United States, 404
U.S. 958 (1971).
110601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979).
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not be disclosed-at least if the duty not to transfer is clearly
spelled out.
If these critical issues are all resolved in favor of the government, or even if only the last two are, the combination of
ordinary executive housekeeping regulations and § 641 creates
a de facto official secrets act. An employee's unauthorized revelation, at least if it is embodied in tangible form, of any fact
constitutes a disposition of the government's intangible property; the person who participates by receiving the information
is guilty as well if she knows the circumstances surrounding the
transfer. The inquiry must then turn to the question of whether
a first amendment defense exists for this type of behavior.
This problem has been perceived as a serious one in recent
espionage cases. In United States v. Boyce 181 and United States
v. Truong Dinh Hung, 82 circuit courts permitted § 641 convictions to stand. However, since the defendants were simultaneously convicted of other, more serious espionage offenses,
both courts relied on the principle of concurrent sentences to
obviate the need to consider the issue at length. 183 In United
States v. Lee,' 84 and United States v. Kampiles,185 the § 641
convictions for transfer of documents were apparently upheld
without discussion. While in Kampiles, the government lost
actual possession of a document, Lee involved the same copies
as those at issue in Boyce. The Morison indictment for transfer
of a copy of a government document was upheld under § 641
86
as well.

The courts should not create an "Official Secrets Act"
through relentless expansion of general legislation that was obviously not enacted for speech restricting purposes. Judges have
only the plain-meaning rule and the facts of a particular case
before them; they have no basis for confidence that when their
interpretations are applied in other contexts, a first amendment
181594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979).
182629

F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).

I'3 Judge Winter wrote a thoughtful protest in Truong Dinh Hung against dodging
the issue by the concurrent sentence doctrine. He would not have construed § 641 to

reach conduct covered by more explicit law.
1- 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979).
185609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979).
"1 Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 663-65 (1985).
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defense can be employed. For example, what can courts do with
the employee who reveals a confidential EPA report with which
he disagrees as a matter of public policy, but who is motivated
in part by a desire to advance his own career? Furthermore,
who is a member of the "press" and therefore entitled to raise
a first amendment defense to a charge of receiving stolen goods?
Perhaps it is tolerable to permit the Executive to shape the
conditions of government employment without clear guidance,
but for the courts to use the criminal law this way ignores the
prohibition on common law crimes. In effect § 641, so read,
becomes yet another instrument by which the Executive is empowered to pick and choose its targets for suppressing speech.
D. Lessons from the Confusion
The espionage statutes, particularly §§ 793(d) and 793(e),
embody the serious tension between the executive and the legislative branches as to the proper scope of laws forbidding disclosure of national defense information. Congress has refused
to adopt sweeping secrecy proposals, no doubt in part because
it relies on general publications for much of its information about
foreign and military affairs-information that facilitates congressional oversight of an increasingly secretive Executive. The
espionage statutes were originally formulated within the executive branch; Congress has never attempted to formulate such
legislation of its own. Congress has instead simply modified
certain executive proposals and enacted others almost unaltered; in some cases, Congress has approved only part of an
integrated package of legislation which is virtually meaningless
when severed from the whole.
The incredible confusion among the existing espionage statutes points to several lessons. First, the statutes reveal the
anomalies likely to result from selective congressional adoption
of discrete components of sweeping executive initiatives. Protection of defense secrets is too complex to be handled by ad
hoc amendment of executive branch proposals. The subject is
one of inherent tension between the legislative and executive
branches. Congress must actively undertake to formulate its
own legislation.
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The second lesson to be extracted from the confusion of
existing law is the difficulty of dealing with all forms of information disclosure at once. The 1917 debates are a morass in
large part because of the continued conflation of the problems
of spying, government employee leaks and newspaper publication. Sections 793 and 794 cover all people and all defense
information, making distinctions between spying and well-meaning publication only through cumbersome and opaque descriptions of mental states. It is essential to recognize that spying,
breaches of secrecy by government employees and public discussion of defense matters by the press and the citizenry at large
are distinct issues. While these activities pose somewhat similar
dangers to national security, the hazards of prohibition and
zealous enforcement are very different. Above all, the legitimate
social values underlying many leaks and publications require
separate treatment. Lumping them together can only produce
unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting true spies, conflicting
interpretations of the legal status of government employees, and
utter confusion in the rules applicable to both publishers and
audience. As a result, all-or-nothing prohibitions either permit
publication without significant restraint, or subject it to sweeping restrictions that are appropriate to spying but not to concerned debate about national policy. Publication and espionage
should not be encompassed within a single prohibition, except
in those rare instances where the type of information at issue is
extremely sensitive and of little value to informed political
debate.
We fear that the Executive and the Supreme Court have
learned a third lesson from the confusion of existing law, one
we believe to be unwarranted-namely that Congress is not
capable of, or at least is ineffective in, dealing with the problems
of secrecy and speech in any general framework.
V. Conclusion
Our legal tradition insists that reasonably clear statutory
statements that reflect actual legislative intent precede the imposition of criminal sanctions or other government actions
which trench on constitutionally-protected individual rights.
With respect to national security secrecy issues, however, and
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related problems of the right to travel, the Supreme Court has
since Pentagon Papers committed itself to a different model of
institutional legitimacy--one of executive empowerment.
While Congress retains its primacy as a matter of rhetoric,
the burdens of initiative and clear statement have been shifted,
thereby shaking the foundations of our institutional controls.
The long-term effects of this development on the structure of
American government are even more important than their immediate impact on civil liberties. Executive decisions in the
national security area frequently rest on less secure political
fbundations than do legislative determinations. Plagued by overbroad standards and selective enforcement, executive judgments fail to incorporate sufficiently considerations of principle
and generality. Too often, shortsighted concerns of self-interest
and expediency exert undue influence.
Perhaps the quality of true security in the modern world is
such that these characteristics of executive action, usually conceived of as incompatible with our consitutional traditions, are
actually essential to their survival. We doubt that. Yet our principal concern is that the questions are not being appraised in
terms of institutional responsibility. The legal profession and the
press have generally taken their cue from the Supreme Court;
they have focused on the results in national security cases, and
not on the separation of powers issues implicit in them. The
Court has offered no coherent rationale for its rejection of
congressional control, and neither scholars nor practitioners
have taken up the challenge ofjustifying or criticizing the radical
shift in institutional authority that seems to be in process.

